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Australia’s Step-up is one of many international initiatives facing toward the Pacific. A strong Pacific voice is emerging 
as a counterweight to them.
Executive Summary
After a long absence, the world has rediscovered the Pacific. Following this escalation of international interest in the Pacific over 
the last decade, the region finds itself the subject of as many as a dozen new international initiatives, most notably China’s Belt and 
Road initiative, Australia’s Pacific Step-up and the broader Indo-Pacific geostrategic phenomenon.
As these initiatives have proliferated, the Pacific peoples themselves have reclaimed their own voices, heard most prominently in the 
world’s global climate discourse and in the region’s own Blue Pacific initiative. But there is a way to go before the region’s own voice 
has equal weight.
Australia’s Pacific Step-up, while welcome, shares with its international counterparts this weakness: though well-intentioned, it has 
been conceived as an external initiative. The Whitlam Institute is concerned that Australia’s past and emerging engagement in the 
region pays insufficient attention to Pacific perspectives – not only official positions but also the voices of ordinary people from across 
the region. The Institute engaged Peacifica to contribute to filling this gap, to learn from a cross-section of Pacific islanders about 
their perspectives on the world and their place in it and how other countries (notably Australia) can best contribute to their future. 
This report, and the field interviews and conversations that support it, are the first stage in a dialogue that the Institute and Peacifica 
hope will continue as a constructive contribution to the well-being of all Pacific people and to the promotion of a secure and 
prosperous region. We want to see an enhanced and comprehensive Australian foreign policy engagement that can better position 
Australia as a member of the Pacific community.
The research was conducted in Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, three countries with which Australia has deep historical, social and 
economic connections. Its findings relate specifically to those places, but due to the methodologies employed, some can be inferred 
with confidence to apply more widely given their prominence across the research sites and broader discourses in the region. We will 
be taking the findings back to the region to explore these questions further.
The research team, comprising Australian and Pacific island researchers, spent time in the three countries in September and October 
2019. Around 150 people from diverse backgrounds participated through a series of focus groups and key informant interviews, 
followed by expert seminars in November, in Canberra and Suva, at which initial findings were presented and discussed. 
Critical to these conversations was the freedom given to participants themselves to identify what was important. The few questions 
asked by the researchers invited participants to reflect on their hopes for their future and what roles their own governments and 
people, as well as external ones had to play to realise that future. The team did not ask about climate change, labour migration or 
aid – all issues came from the participants themselves. From this the research team, led by Dr Tess Newton Cain, identified the key 
themes and recommendations that emerged from the data.
6Key messages
Three key messages emerged from the conversations that 
comprise this research. 
1 Quality relationships matter more than quantities 
of aid, trade or other engagement. Australia does not need 
to prove itself by giving the most – the country is already 
recognised as being intrinsic and essential to the Pacific 
island states. It is this underlying positive disposition that 
drives the occasionally very strong critique of Australia by 
its Pacific neighbours. They want relationships that put the 
concerns of Pacific peoples on a par with those of Australia, 
that reach beyond the narrow bands of government and civil 
society, that prioritise local ownership and that recognise our 
shared histories and identities. This valuing of quality over 
quantity is reflected in the mismatch between the increasing 
number of Australian programs, projects and initiatives and 
the infrequency of their being referenced by the people we 
listened to.
2 Values, norms and ways of doing things matter a 
great deal to Pacific islanders from Solomon Islands, Fiji and 
Vanuatu. Pacific islanders embody multiple identities from 
the village to the region, and these inform how they engage 
with the world, including with Australians. Interacting in 
sympathy with this ‘Pacific Mode’ of working together – in all 
its complexities and commonalities - is essential. 
3 Australia is one of many potential relationships 
for Pacific islanders. The domestic concerns of Pacific 
islanders are connected more than ever before to global 
ones, notably but not exclusively through the climate crisis. 
Many participants in the research also recognise the region’s 
geostrategic significance. This recognition of their needs and 
potential leverage are giving them more urgency and more 
confidence in working with international partners, chiefly 
other Pacific states, Australia, New Zealand and China. In this 
environment Australia’s natural advantages are confounded by 
our inability to engage with the ‘Pacific Mode’. 
Recommendations
Positive change in Australia’s relationship with the region must 
start with, but is not limited to, the Australian government. 
Even as the Pacific Step-up has been acknowledged as 
progress in the right direction, it is only a first step if Australia 
is to realise the full potential of its Pacific relationships. We 
recommend action in four areas to put Australia more firmly 
on that path:
1 Shift gears on the Step-up: The research participants see 
Australian engagement with the region, including the Pacific 
Step-up, predominantly as unilateral initiatives of Australia. 
They comprise things that are done for or to the Pacific, 
not with it. Pacific people are looking for reassurance that 
Australia shares their concerns and is working alongside them, 
as an equal partner, to address shared challenges. As a start 
we recommend that the Australian government:
1 Some limited tertiary programs and media initiatives exist, but are not enough to meet the need. See the full recommendations for details.
- Convene a regional Partnership Summit, at which diverse 
participants from civil society, private sector, government, 
community and churches from across the region can 
explore themes of most significance to Pacific peoples. 
For the Australian contingent, strong Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander leadership and participation  
is essential. 
- Deepen relationships beyond the capitals, both in the 
Pacific states and in Australia. A multiplicity of civil 
society, sporting, commercial, religious and cultural links 
are ready to be developed, in some cases building on 
existing initiatives.
- Improve government, private sector and NGO 
partnerships by encouraging Australian government 
agencies, businesses and INGOs to better recognise 
existing local capacity and support the development of 
new capacity where requested. 
- Encourage INGOs to transfer power to local civil society 
organisations to increase perceived levels of trust, 
autonomy and open communication.
2 Invest in Australia’s Pacific Literacy: Pacific islanders 
know more about Australia than we do about them. We are 
in effect stepping up without knowing where we are going. 
This can be addressed by:
- Promoting knowledge of the Pacific, including its 
languages, in Australian schools and universities and 
through mainstream media.1
- Developing a ‘Pacific Capable’ strategy to prepare 
Australia and Australians to live, work, and socialise with 
Pacific island people in their own country and in the 
countries of the region.
- Working with Pacific diaspora communities to build 
the capacity of government departments and agencies, 
contractors and INGOs that work in the region.
3 Get our own house in order: Pacific islanders look 
past Australia’s coastline when they turn their gaze in our 
direction, and they see several things that make them uneasy. 
Among the most prominent of these are the status of 
Indigenous Australians, climate policy and inequality of trade 
opportunities. We recommend that Australia:
- Demonstrate a systematic, consistent and constructive 
long-term approach to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation in line with the Boe Declaration and the 
planned 2050 strategy, to be considered at the 51st 
meeting of Pacific Islands Forum leaders.
- Demonstrate real change in the status of Indigenous 
Australians. Pacific islanders want to be able to see that 
Indigenous Australians are visible and active throughout 
Australian society and that the Australian world-view is 
informed by Indigenous perspectives and leadership. 
74 Level the playing field when it comes to access: Travel 
to Australia, and doing business here, are perennial headaches 
for Pacific people. These concerns were raised repeatedly and 
by participants of all backgrounds. Action in this area would 
be a potent symbol of Australia’s good faith towards the 
region. We recommend that Australia:
- Make it easier for all Pacific people to travel to and work 
in Australia through increased access to short-term visas, 
student and professional exchange programs.
- Prioritise products from the Pacific for regulatory and 
administrative processes (e.g. biosecurity approval) to get 
them into Australian markets.
- Hold a regular Pacific Expo in Australia to showcase both 
primary and value-added products and foster business to 
business ties.
In aiming to understand Pacific perspectives on the world and 
Australia’s place in the region, this research started with two 
assumptions and finishes with them being confirmed – but 
with important lessons. One assumption was that Australia 
is respected and recognised for its decades-long contribution 
to the Pacific. The other was that listening to our Pacific 
neighbours more will lay the foundation for  
better relationships.
The first lesson for Australia cuts to the heart of our self-
image as good mates. Despite Australia’s valued history of 
contribution, the ways in which those we listened to talked 
about the distance between us, and their sense of sadness 
as they did so, should trouble anyone who values the idea of 
Australia as part of the Pacific community. The second lesson 
is the unexpected realisation that in seeing ourselves through 
Pacific islander eyes, we Australians will get to know ourselves 
better. If we want to realise our shared vision of a peaceful 
and prosperous future, not only must we improve our Pacific 
island relationships, we also need to work on things at home. 
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‘The Pacific’ is enjoying a moment of unprecedented 
international attention. Pacific leaders are at the forefront of 
global action on the climate emergency and the Blue Pacific2 is 
making the region more visible as a global player. Meanwhile, 
the region is one of many places where the expansion of 
China and the reaction of other countries is being played 
 out. The region’s leaders, for the most part, welcome this  
increased international interest, but are wary of the  
underlying geopolitics. 
This upsurge in interest is characterised perhaps more than 
anything else by a massive imbalance in power between the 
region and the international community. While the Blue Pacific 
has the potential for the region to be seen as a more powerful 
entity in its own right, it is still a new concept. The Pacific 
remains dwarfed by other international players in everything 
but geography. Pacific islanders have had little opportunity  
to articulate their own position or to demonstrate their  
own knowledge and capabilities in the context of  
international relations.
It is in this environment that Australia is implementing its 
Pacific Step-up3; and its increased diplomatic, aid4, investment 
and military presence is in fact one of the more significant 
factors at play in the region. As the region’s largest and 
nearest neighbour, and one that in some respects is part of 
the ‘Pacific family’, Australia has the opportunity both to 
strengthen the region’s status and forge deep and long-lasting 
relationships at all levels of society. Australia, the Pacific and 
New Zealand can aspire to be a truly united Pacific family. 
More than a step-up, this has the potential to be a coming-
together – if we all go about it the right way.
2 The Blue Pacific is a narrative developed by the Pacific Island Forum member states. The narrative “highlights the importance of the Pacific taking 
ownership of its future. [It] speaks to the unique challenges and distinct priorities of each island nation, while also emphasising the collective potential 
of the region’s shared stewardship of the Pacific Ocean; recognising our shared ocean identity, ocean geography, and ocean resources.” (Tukuitonga 
2018]
3 Through the Pacific Step-up, Australia aims “[to take] our partnerships with the Pacific to a new level. We want to work with our Pacific partners to 
build a Pacific region that is secure strategically, stable economically and sovereign politically.” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2019) Various arms of 
government are involved. See the ‘Context’ section for more details.
4 In the 2019/2020 budget the amount of aid directed towards the Pacific was $1.4billion, which is 35% of the total (Davidson; 2019)
What do ordinary Pacific islanders think about all this? 
What do they want for their own futures, and what sort of 
relationships would they like with the rest of the world? And 
where does Australia in particular fit into this picture? The 
Whitlam Institute has engaged Peacifica to seek the views of 
Pacific islanders on these questions. The Institute recognises 
that the Step-up represents an important opportunity for 
Australia to demonstrate its role as a constructive regional 
and global citizen, in the belief that this will benefit not only 
our Pacific neighbours but also Australia’s own strategic, 
economic and cultural interests. For Peacifica this research 
is an important contribution to its own mission to promote 
a more peaceful and secure Pacific region at a time when 
strategic, environmental and economic factors are increasing 
the risk of conflict. 
This report amplifies the voices of Pacific island people from 
Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. It brings together the 
perspectives of around 150 citizens of these countries on 
the world, the future and their own place in it. In a series of 
interviews and focus group conversations the participants 
describe how they would like other countries to work with 
them and what they need to do themselves to facilitate good 
international relationships. 
The participants, from many walks of life from city, to town, 
to village, relished the opportunity to talk about these issues 
– they were keen to speak their mind, in the knowledge that 
their views would be heard by policy makers in Australia and 
their own countries. 
They are also very keen to know what happens next. They 
want to know how policymakers will respond to their 
messages, and how this dialogue will continue. It is in that 
spirit of dialogue that we offer this report. Its messages are 
directed primarily at the Australian government to inform the 
future implementation and refinement of the Pacific Step-up, 
but we hope they will be equally relevant to other partners 
and donors and valuable as a tool for Pacific islander civil 
society and governments. We will be taking the report back to 
the region through 2020 to continue the dialogue.
Defining ‘the Pacific’
When talking about ‘the Pacific’ this report is referring 
to the region known variously as the Pacific islands, 
the South West Pacific or Melanesia, Micronesia and 
Polynesia. It includes non-sovereign territories like New 
Caledonia, but does not include Hawaii.
Many issues that were discussed by the research 
participants were raised strongly and consistently 
across the three focus countries. This does not mean 
that such points can be generalised across the whole 
region, but it does provide grounds for informed 
assumptions and further research. 
Where necessary this report will make it clear when 
issues and recommendations are specific to the focus 
countries or can be extended to the region as a whole.
9The Project
This project involved qualitative research into the perspectives of Pacific islanders from Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu on how 
their countries and Australia can collaborate to realise a mutually beneficial, shared future. The choice of research locations was in 
part determined by the structural constraints of the project, including limited economic and human resources, which precluded the 
inclusion of more than three research sites. Given the research team had existing research expertise and local networks in Vanuatu, 
Fiji and Solomon Islands these emerged as natural target locations. The fact that these three countries all have long-standing 
structural relationships with Australia as well as distinctly different political histories, geographies and international relations ensured 
both density of research data and diversity in research themes. 
Highlighting our commitment to privileging local perspectives, the project was developed and implemented in collaboration with 
local research partners in each of the three research countries:
Fiji:  Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF), Suva. 
Solomon Islands: Development Services Exchange (DSE), Honiara. 
Vanuatu:  Linda Kenni, Development Consultant, Port Vila. 
These local partners had continuous input into research design and development of research material, ensuring that the project 
remained culturally appropriate and in line with local regulations. Our local partners were also instrumental in the recruitment of 
research participants and in charge of conducting focus groups in their respective countries. They also shared their thinking in 
relation to the preliminary analysis of the data, which was a key part of the overall project. CCF and Linda Kenni presented in the 
expert consultations (see below).
The full research team is as shown:
Empirical research was conducted in October 2019. Dr Tess Newton Cain conducted key informant interviews and liaised with local 
partners in Vanuatu, Dr Geir Henning Presterudstuen led the in-country research in Fiji, while Mr James Cox was in charge of strategy 
and data collection in Solomon Islands. The breakdown of participants was as follows: 
Fiji
Louchrisha Hussain Country Liaison CEO, CCF Fiji
Lucrisha Nair Researcher Program Manager, CCF Fiji
Dr Geir Henning Presterudstuen Researcher Senior Lecturer in Anthropology, Western 
Sydney University 
Solomon Islands
Jennifer Wate Country Liaison CEO, DSE Solomon Islands 
Lucrisha Nair Researcher Consultant to DSE Solomon Islands 
James Cox Project Director, Researcher Executive Director, Peacifica
Vanuatu
Linda Kenni Researcher & country liaison Development Consultant
Dr Tess Newton Cain Research Director, Researcher Adjunct Associate Professor, 
Griffith Asia Institute
Focus Groups Key Informants
Women Men Youth 
(< 30 yo)
Women Men Total
Fiji 5 FGs 12 32 8 5 3 52
Focus groups were held in Suva and a surrounding village with participant groups from Suva (and surrounding areas of Serua 
and Kasavu), Lautoka, Kadavu and Koro Island. Interviews were held in Suva. Participants included business leaders, civil society 
representatives, civil servants and academics.
Solomon 
Islands
5 FGs 18 20 13 6 4 48
Focus groups were held in Honiara and at a workshop outside the city attended by representatives from across the country. 
Interviews were held in Honiara. Participants included private sector, civil society, civil service, MPs, youth, students, church. Overall 
participants from every province were represented in the research. 
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After the main stage of data collection we sought further advice from the broader research community through two consultation 
meetings with Australian and Pacific experts. These expert consultations were held at the Australian National University (ANU) on 7 
November 2019 and at the University of the South Pacific (USP), Suva on 28 November 2019.
Methods
The project combined two well-established qualitative research methods (see the discussion of the theoretical foundation below) 
to gain in-depth understanding of social issues, as well as people’s experiences of these. Underpinned by a grounded theory 
perspective, this methodological approach was taken in order to obtain data from purposefully selected groups with particular 
insights or a breadth of experiences rather than from statistically representative samples of the population. Our key emphasis was 
on consulting with representatives from six broadly defined participant groups: youth, women, men, regional or ‘out of capital’ 
residents, experts and private sector representatives. Additionally, in Fiji, we endeavoured to recruit people from a variety of ethnic 
and cultural groups and religious affiliations. 
Focus Groups
Given this research project explicitly set out to amplify Pacific island voices in order to inform discussions about Australian 
engagement in the region from the bottom-up, focus group discussions were identified as a key method of data collection. Focus 
groups allow for a variety of paradigms, world-views and perspectives to be discussed concurrently and provide research participants 
with an active role in shaping the form and content of research discussions. Local research partners organised and facilitated 
these discussions, ensuring they were set up and conducted according to local cultural protocols. Although all focus groups were 
structured around key research themes, the format allowed for moderators and participants to interpret these key topics in the 
context of local discussions and add new topics for consideration. The result was that data collected provided both a snapshot of 
the specific key concerns and considerations of each of the three countries, as well as a broad overview of people’s experiences and 
expectations of Australian engagement in the region. 
Focus Groups Key Informants
Women Men Youth 
(< 30 yo)
Women Men Total
Vanuatu 4 FGs 22 11 8 6 4 43
Focus groups were held in Port Vila and Tanna. Interviews were held in Port Vila. Participants included civil society, 
unemployed, working mothers, civil servants, private sector, teachers, retirees, lawyers, academics.
Total 14 FGs 59 56 29 17 11 143
This shows the location of the research participants’ homes in the Solomon Islands consultations. Many participants 
identified multiple ‘homes’. All provinces were covered, as well as Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. Image: Melinda Kii/DSE
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Key informant interviews
In addition to consulting a broad representation of local 
communities, it was a key priority for our research project to 
gain insights from local experts in the fields of community 
development, international relations, Australia-Pacific 
relationships more broadly and from the private sector. We 
thus identified key informants in each of our three research 
sites that were targeted for in-depth, semi-structured, one-on-
one interviews. 
Typically, data collected from in-depth interviews of these 
kinds are not generalisable to the population at large but are 
rather designed to create thematic categories from research 
data that can be compared and analysed with the lived 
experience of research participants. In this research project the 
purpose of key informant interviews was two-fold: First, to 
provide insights and opinions from prominent people working 
on the frontline in political decision-making, diplomacy, 
business, lobbying and international development in the 
region. These respondents can, in the context of this research 
project, be considered the expert voices on how relations 
between Australia and Pacific island countries are experienced 
and understood politically. Secondly, these interviews add 
depth to the research data by adding specificity and detail 
from a variety of vantage points, including the business sector, 
faith-based communities and the public service. 
Theoretical foundation
This project follows the tradition of grounded theorising. 
Grounded theory sets out to discover or construct theory from 
data, systematically obtained and analysed using comparative 
analysis. In the context of this project, that principle is 
articulated in how research themes and analytical concepts 
emerged from the research data rather than being pre-
determined by the researchers. Data collection commenced 
with a broad query about how participants view their own 
country and relationships with other countries before letting 
local perspectives inform a gradual development of more 
specific topics such as attitudes to Australia and Australians. 
By continuously reviewing, comparing, contrasting and 
analysing responses, researchers then identified recurring 
themes and patterns in a manner that is common to all 
empirically driven theorising. This flexible research design 
allows participants’ own perspectives to become a central 
part of the analysis, reflecting our overall commitment to 
amplifying Pacific voices. 
Qualitative research methods like those employed here are 
consequently not strictly driven by set sample sizes but rather 
by the principle of data saturation. In practical terms this 
means that collection continues until a point is reached where 
no new information is obtained. While this study was based 
on an expected sample size for key informant interviews of 
approximately 30 individuals (10 in each of the 3 research 
locations) and approximately 120 focus group participants 
(40 in each research location), we were predominantly guided 
by the concept of saturation as it became evident through 
comparison and data analysis. The thematic organisation of 
this report emerged as a result of this process.
Issues and Limitations
This report lays no claim to presenting the complete analysis 
of Pacific islanders’ perspectives on Australia’s engagement 
in the region. By using purposely selected participants, this 
project does not provide a view that is representative of 
the region or the respective countries as a whole. While 
participants came from a broad cross-section of our three 
research settings, our emphasis on experts and collaboration 
with local research partners that have an active profile in 
their respective civil sector made sure Pacific islanders that 
have had an ongoing interest in politics, local development, 
international relations, civil rights discourses, business and 
community development were privileged in data collection. 
It is unclear to what extent their experiences are reflected in 
the broader population and the results presented here ought 
to be contextualised in relation to future research targeting 
different demographics and larger sample sizes. 
Our comparative analysis also reveals that participants across 
the three countries emphasised different concerns, viewpoints 
and experiences. This is not surprising given the ethnic, 
cultural, political and linguistic diversity in the region, as well 
as the different political circumstances of the countries we 
chose to do research in. The divergent responses also call for 
caution in generalising these results across the Pacific Islands 
region. Although there were many recurring themes across 
the different research sites these belie nuances and differences 
that need to be explored in more detail through further 
qualitative inquiries within and beyond the countries that 
were chosen for this study. This diversity is in itself a key lesson 
of the research: any generalisations of ‘the Pacific’ are likely 
to miss important local distinctions. Pacific literacy hinges on 
understanding this diversity and finding ways to navigate it.
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Context
Fiji Solomon Islands Vanuatu
Population 912,241 (2018) 599,419 (2016) 272,459 (2016)
Ethnicity
Population 1970 (UK) 1978 (UK) 1980 (France & UK)
Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama Manasseh Sogavare Charlot Salwai Tabimasmas
Population 1970 (UK) 1978 (UK) 1980 (France & UK)
GDP (PPP)/per cap 
($US)
$9.1 billion/$10,251 (2018) $1.2 billion/$2,307 (2019) $820 million/$2,850 (2018)
Australian   
- aid ($AU)
$51 million (2018-19) $198.3 million (2018-
2019)
$63 million (2018-19)
- 2-way trade $2.09 billion (2017) $316 million (2017) $300 million (2017)
Diaspora in Australia 48,000 (incl Indo-Fijian)* 2,000 1,000
Australian expatriates 3,000 1,500 3,000
Sources: DFAT country data, CIA World Factbook
Fiji
This research was conducted in the context of what people locally have described as an ongoing road to a fully functional democracy 
in Fiji. Fiji has a long history of political instability and military intervention stretching from the first of many coups d’état in 1987 to 
the military intervention in 2006. The two most recent general elections (2014 and 2018) were conducted under a new Constitution 
that, among other things, removed long-standing features of Fijian legislation such as race-based electoral rolls and representative 
quotas, the Great Council of Chiefs, an unelected Upper House and district-based representation. The Fiji First Party, under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama, has won a majority government in both elections and thus had a mandate 
to implement its own policy agenda both locally and internationally. 
This relative parliamentary stability belies ongoing tension across various parts of society. There are continuing concerns about 
issues such as press freedom, freedom of assembly and judicial independence among local and international organisations. Many in 
Fiji’s civil society also experience little political or economic support for their work. A common sentiment expressed during research 
interviews and focus groups was that there is a need to develop a more inclusive and consultative style of governance.
Notwithstanding these internal political concerns, Prime Minister Bainimarama and his Fiji First government has raised Fiji’s 
international profile considerably in the same period. After years of being subjected to political sanctions, including suspensions from 
the Commonwealth and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and trade restrictions from key international partners such as Australia, Fiji 
currently enjoys strong economic, diplomatic and political relations with both traditional allies and emerging regional powerhouses 
such as China. In addition, Fiji has taken on regional leadership positions through the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) and is an outspoken voice in the global fight for action on climate change. During the 
time of the majority of key informant interviews and focus groups the Prime Minister was in New York addressing the UN General 
Assembly in a much-publicised speech aiming to set the international agenda for climate action.
Fiji’s position in the world, its challenges and opportunities, as well as the perceived tension between Fiji’s global presence and lack 
of real local reform were key issues dominating discussions during the research phase in Fiji. While many people seem cautiously 
optimistic about Fiji’s increasing significance as an international player and the possibility of leveraging that for positive economic 
outcomes, concerns about the local human rights situation remains.
Rotuman, 
1.2%
Other,
4.5%
Other,
1.3%
iTaukei,
56.8%
Melanesian,
94.5%
Ni-Vanuatu,
98.50%
Polynesian, 3.0%
Micronesian,1.2%
Other, 
1.50%
Indian,
37.5%
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Solomon Islands
Two decades since the start of the Tensions5 and two years 
on from the end of the Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 2019 saw a peaceful national 
election resulting in Manasseh Sogavare claiming the 
prime ministership for the fourth (non-consecutive) time. 
Many Solomon Islanders want to look ahead and focus on 
strengthening the country’s economy to realise its potential 
as one of the Pacific’s largest countries. For others, the 
underlying causes of the Tensions – and new drivers – are 
still present and unresolved. Particularly in civil society, there 
are fears that violent conflict could return if these issues are 
exacerbated.
‘The Switch’ in Solomon Islands’ recognition from Taiwan to 
China in mid-September of 2019 had the potential to do just 
that. It was marked by the immediate withdrawal of Taiwan’s 
diplomatic presence and the abandonment of a number of 
valued aid projects. Despite a consultation process that saw 
a government taskforce travel widely to other Pacific states, 
and to China and Taiwan, Solomon Islands citizens themselves 
felt that they had not been consulted. While many people 
were sad to see Taiwan go, and some were concerned about 
China’s entry, it was the way the government had made 
the decision that concerned people the most. The Switch 
dominated public conversation and the media during the 
research visit in early October. 
The Switch has exacerbated tensions in the country. Permits 
have been denied for civil protest about it and other 
issues. Some provinces, most notably Malaita, are calling 
for greater autonomy, a call that may be strengthened by 
the overwhelming vote for independence in neighbouring 
Bougainville. A petition with 6000 signatures calling for the 
Prime Minister to step down was submitted to parliament 
during the research visit. The country has remained peaceful, 
but not untroubled.
The country’s private sector struggles to grow, facing 
challenges with internal capacity, external competition and the 
high cost of doing business. The new fibre optic data cable, 
majority funded by Australia, is keenly anticipated and is 
perhaps the most visible evidence of the Pacific Step-up.
Vanuatu 
Vanuatu will go to general elections in March 2020, and this 
was an issue that was very much front of mind for many 
of those who participated in this research. The outgoing 
Prime Minister, Charlot Salwai Tabimasmas, joins a very small 
group of people who have led governments in Vanuatu for 
a full parliamentary term. There is a strong sense that 2020 
will be very significant year for the country. As well as the 
elections, there will be celebrations of the 40th anniversary of 
Independence, and the hosting of the PIF Leaders’ meeting. 
Vanuatu is expected to graduate from Least Developed 
Country (LDC) status by the end of 2020.
The recent uptick in Pacific focus in Canberra, Wellington, 
Washington and elsewhere has been significant for Vanuatu. 
There have been numerous visits to Vanuatu by various 
5 The Tensions describes a time of widespread violence and the collapse of the Solomon Islands government. They ran from 1998 until 2003, though 
their complex causes and effects extend well beyond that timespan. More than 35,000 people were displaced by the violence. The multinational 
RAMSI initiative was instrumental in stabilising the country and continued until July 2017.
countries’ ministers, defence and security personnel and 
others. In addition, members of the Vanuatu leadership 
have been invited to other countries to meet with their 
counterparts. There have also been a number of ‘soft power’ 
activities, including sporting visits and cultural exchanges. 
Whilst there is an overall level of awareness and interest in 
these aspects of political and social discourse, the focus of 
most people remains on issues that are essentially local in 
nature. 
Underpinning many conversations in Vanuatu are twin 
concerns about the state of the economy and the quality of 
governance and political leadership. The country adopted 
a new blueprint for development in 2017: the National 
Sustainable Development Plan (NSDP). It envisages that 
sustainable development for the country will progress in 
line with three pillars: social, economic and environmental. 
The 2020 elections will be the first to be held since the 
adoption of this plan. Whilst it appears to have been better 
socialised than previous development plans in Vanuatu, it is 
not guaranteed that the contents of the NSDP will necessarily 
inform policy platforms in the lead up to the elections, nor 
how people will exercise their votes.
Commentary and Media 
The recent and current political and policy preoccupation with 
Australia’s relationships with the countries of the Pacific islands 
region is reflected to a degree in contemporary commentary. 
However, there remain serious gaps in what is available, when 
it comes to ascertaining the views and concerns of Pacific 
islanders. A notable exception is a predominantly quantitative 
study undertaken in Vanuatu during 2018 (Clarke & Feeny; 
2019). An important contribution of this research into Pacific 
Perspectives is to address and rectify this imbalance.
The Pacific Step-up originated with a speech made by then 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull at the meeting of Pacific 
Islands Leaders Forum in Pohnpei, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, in 2016 (Hayward-Jones: 2016) and was given 
its official imprimatur by virtue of its use in the Foreign Policy 
White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017). More 
recently it has been adopted as a signature initiative by Prime 
Minister Scott Morrison (Morrison, 2018). Since then the use 
of this term has become accepted within Australian policy 
and diplomatic circles (Newton Cain, 2019a). Its usage has 
certainly been noted by Pacific leaders and commentators and 
we have seen instances of it being reflected back in speeches 
and comments that they have made, including on social 
media.  
Academics and others have stressed the need to increase the 
number of Pacific voices in the conversations in order to make 
them more meaningful. It is significant to note that in some 
cases, these calls are themselves framed in terms of Australia 
and Australians doing the talking to people in and from the 
Pacific, most particularly when it comes to security discourses 
(George; 2019). It is not surprising to see that a prominent 
location for analyses of this type is found in the security arena, 
given that this lens has historically been one most favoured 
by Australian policy makers in relation to the Pacific, and one 
which has seen a resurgence in prominence recently (Newton 
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Cain; 2018). However, there have been some attempts to 
caution against narrowly framing Pacific relationships through 
a securitisation lens (Poole; 2019). Indeed, for some this is 
seen as counter-productive as it may prompt greater resistance 
to Australian influence on the part of Pacific island states 
(Wallis; 2018).
More significantly, there has been less recognition of the 
importance of listening when it comes to discussions about 
bilateral and multilateral relationships, whether in relation to 
security or in other realms. From the outset, the Step-up has 
been framed as Australia reaching out to the Pacific rather 
than an exercise in regional collaboration or co-design, and 
while a key message is that Australia wants ‘more than just 
talk’ (Wyeth 2019) the level of engagement remains on 
Australia’s terms. That is not to say that the importance of 
listening for the future of Australian engagement in the region 
has not been articulated. This includes exhortations that 
Australia needs to commit to a ‘listen and learn’ approach 
that includes more nuance and diversity than has been evident 
to date (Newton Cain; 2018).
At the heart of these critiques, and others, is a recognition 
that what is really needed when it comes to protecting 
Australia’s interests in and with the Pacific is real investment 
in building and sustaining relationships. For as long as this 
component is disregarded or deprioritised, key aspects of the 
Pacific Step-up will be sub-optimal, particularly when it comes 
to ensuring their legitimacy (Fletcher & Yeophantong; 2019).
In some areas, there have been calls for Australian policy 
makers to not only look for greater collaboration with Pacific 
island countries and their leaderships, but to acknowledge 
and embrace that it is the island states who are the leaders 
in these critical conversations (Teaiwa; 2019). Very recently 
we have seen leading Pacific island voices address issues 
of Australian domestic policy where they see disconnects 
that can undermine the avowed foreign policy objectives 
associated with the Pacific Step-up (Bhagwan; 2019). This has 
been most notable in relation to the issue of climate change 
and was highlighted starkly at the meeting of Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF) leaders in August of 2019 (Armbruster & Newton 
Cain; 2019). However, there are other areas where these 
tensions can also arise including around trade relationships, 
ease of travel between the Pacific and Australia and labour 
mobility (Orton & Howes; 2019).
Another aspect of this discourse relates to the manner in 
which Australia engages with Pacific island countries. When 
it comes to engaging in conversations with Pacific island 
people and communities, there is a legitimate concern that 
Australian officials (and others) lack key cultural awareness 
and other competencies thus making it difficult for them to 
gain traction. This deficit comprises two aspects. The first is 
a lack of knowledge and understanding of the complexities 
and fluidities of Pacific geographies, histories and cultural 
expressions (Teaiwa, 2014). The second is an inability or 
refusal to behave in ways that are culturally positive in Pacific 
contexts. This has significant implications both for the quality 
of personal relationships between Australians and Pacific 
islanders, and for strategic reasons (Newton Cain, 2019c).
A significant aspect of the extent and shape of this Pacific 
lacuna in the Australian discourse is a dearth of knowledge 
about the region on the part of the majority of Australians. It 
is a truism that Pacific island people have a very good general 
knowledge about Australia and are often bemused to learn 
that the reverse is far from true. In particular, the voices 
of members of the Pacific diaspora are given insufficient 
amplification. And yet, there are critical resources (including 
those relating to linguistic and cultural competencies) located 
in these communities (Vivekananthan & Cartland; 2019). 
There are calls to invest in sharing Pacific and Australian 
cultural heritage, with particular benefit to regional areas 
in both (Urwin, 2019). Activities of this type can assist in 
addressing the deficit in Australian knowledge of its near 
neighbours.
Pacific islanders are keen consumers of – and participants 
in – local traditional and social media. Over the course of the 
research period, we tracked prominent news stories in the 
media of the three focus countries, with particular reference 
to Australia. In general this exercise showed that public 
discourse is dominated by local concerns. There was not a 
lot of reporting about Australia during that time, and what 
reporting there was mostly concerned issues that intersected 
with domestic concerns.
In Fiji, Australia received relatively little media attention over 
this period. Key topics included Australian domestic policy, 
climate change and sport, with discussions of the Rugby 
World Cup being predominant. New Zealand received 
more coverage. Twitter showed some engagement by Fijian 
commentators with Australian media through retweets  
and comments. 
Mainstream and social media in Solomon Islands was 
dominated by the Switch to China. Mainstream media 
covered the resignation of various ministers and the formal 
steps of the transfer, while social media commentary was 
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overwhelmingly critical of the government’s handling of 
the crisis. Discussion of Australia during this time was 
unsurprisingly limited, confined to reporting on a tourism drive 
for Australians, and a meeting between the two countries’ 
Foreign Ministers.
In Vanuatu, three issues dominated international reporting 
during the research period: labour mobility, West Papua and 
kava. Australia’s Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS) was presented 
in the Vanuatu Daily Post as an important opportunity 
for ni-Vanuatu. A new intake was encouraged to act as 
ambassadors for their country and to abstain from alcohol and 
kava (28 September). The expulsion of a hotel worker from 
Australia for drunkenness was reported on 12 October.
 On social media, West Papua was a hot topic, with emphatic 
support for West Papuan rights. Australia was singled out as 
needing to do more, with Prime Minister Salwai’s comments 
on the topic at the UN General Assembly6 stimulating 
considerable discussion. 
The announcement that Australia planned to increase 
allowable imports of kava to 4kg per person generated a 
lot of online discussion in Vanuatu. Comments on Yumi 
Toktok Stret varied from straightforward welcome of the 
announcement to scepticism of Australia’s sincerity and 
intentions. There were several different discussions on  
the topic.
6 https://asiapacificreport.nz/2019/09/30/australia-needs-to-step-up-on-west-papua-says-vanuatu-at-un-assembly/
Fiji Solomon Islands Vanuatu
14 September to 11 October 25 September – 7 October 28 September – 17 October 
Fiji Times
Fiji Sun
Fijian Broadcasting Corporation (FBC)
Fiji Village
Twitter
Solomon Times
Solomon Star
Solomon Islands Broadcasting 
Corporation (SIBC)
PINA (Pacific Islands News Association)
Yumi TokTok Forum (Facebook)
Forum Solomon Islands –International 
(Facebook)
Vanuatu Daily Post
Loop Vanuatu
Yumi Toktok Stret News (Facebook)
Pacific Media Watch (Asia Pacific Report)
Twitter
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Findings & Discussion
A series of primary and secondary themes emerged from conversations in Fiji (F), Solomon Islands (SI) and Vanuatu (V). These themes 
have been captured in a table under each of the questions asked by researchers. Primary themes are ideas that emerged a number 
of times in a country, while secondary themes may have come out more than once but were less prominent. Maintaining coding for 
country of origin shows both the diversity and consistency of different ideas between the three research locations.7 
What makes your country special?
These data reveal a strong sense of local identity and pride in where people come from. 
A notable area of commonality across the data is the continuing significance of customary systems and practices. Whilst participants 
recognised (and indeed celebrated) the diversity of customary practice within their countries, there was universal recognition of the 
very widespread significance of these traditional forms of being and doing. This recognition was coupled with a desire on the part of 
participants that these systems should be continued, even as other aspects of their societies and economies may change. A common 
thread was the expressed wish of participants that the future of their countries should include a blend of traditional and modern 
outlooks. In some cases, participants articulated that this blended approach entails some tensions, including around gender equity.
7 Thematic responses were mediated by ways in which the issues were discussed by participants, not by guidance from researchers. The research team 
reviewed, aggregated and revised the data several times before finalising these lists.
Primary Themes Secondary Themes
The visibility and enduring nature of traditional/customary 
systems & practice (V)
The country’s human resources, particularly a large 
population of young people (F)
Depth and richness of culture. Melanesia, Polynesia, 
Micronesia all represented. Multiple identities are common. 
The value placed on home – clan, cultural values & practices, 
tradition, ancestors. Knowing your neighbours, “wantoks” (SI)
A talented and resourceful population, evident in cultural 
practices and sport (F)
Multiculturalism (F) Natural resources (SI)
Peace and harmony – minimal conflict between different 
cultural groups (V)
Long history of political violence and instability (F)
Customary forms of relations between people and 
the land. Customary values such as reciprocity, respect and 
collaboration (F)
Vanuatu is a democratic country (V)
Home is the place of security, comfort and peace to which you 
always return. A place (and time) of simplicity (SI)
Vanuatu is a Christian country (V)
Rich in natural resources. (F) Christianity is a defining feature for almost everyone – and 
largely (but not always) positive: not always a unifying force 
(SI)
The colonial legacy arising out of being a French/UK 
condominium (V)
Scenic beauty (SI)
Right now, that’s where we are as we are trying to take stock of what makes us Vanuatu, of what makes us  
different from other countries in the world [KIIV 001]
Culture & church are valuable in letting you be authentic and effective – but can be abused [KIISI 009]
We’re a Goldilocks country – we’re not too big, we’re not too small – we’re not too near, we’re not too far – not too hot, 
not too cold – we’re not too small that economically we would struggle, we’re not too big that socially we would be torn 
apart by some of the tensions that are afflicting other Melanesian societies [KIIV 009]
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The Fiji data is distinct with its reference to the importance of multiculturalism, which includes an acknowledgement of its 
problematised nature. Across the responses we received, it is obvious that people see the relationship between indigenous rights and 
the primacy of indigenous values on the one hand and equality before the law and citizenship rights for everyone on the other as a 
key aspect of modern Fiji. This is perceived to be a uniquely Fijian issue that needs to be solved locally but with international support.
A further element uncovered in the research is the tendency of participants to look to the past when analysing the current situation 
and when identifying strategies for dealing with future problems. Fiji participants were concerned about what cultural and human 
resources the country has available to negotiate social change in the present and how this is operationalised politically. There is a 
strong sense that the present moment is one in which ‘traditional’ values and relations are under pressure and need to be reaffirmed 
or redefined. Many expressed a concern about the future viability of village life, and its associated social organisation and values, 
unless significant investments in infrastructure are made. Related to this is a broader concern about the vulnerability of Fiji’s natural 
resources, including land, water and products of potential commercial value, that might be under threat from climate change, over-
development and foreign ownership. At the same time, participants across the study indicated limited confidence in political leaders 
to deliver the sort of change considered necessary. Similarly, participants in Solomon Islands expressed a sense of loss in recent years, 
reflected in concerns about diet, environmental degradation, demographic changes and climate change.
Several participants described Vanuatu as a ‘young’ country. This is reflected in the prevalence of the colonial legacy as a reference 
point in the data in response to this question and elsewhere. However, the stronger aspect of references to the colonial legacy is its 
duality and the lingering impacts this has had, both positive and negative.8 
What would you like your country to look like in the future?
8 Vanuatu (then known as the New Hebrides) was ruled as a condominium by the UK and France between 1906 and when Independence was achieved 
on July 30, 1980.
Primary Themes Secondary Themes
Improve governance by including a commitment to 
community consultation, protection of human rights and 
openness in decision-making (F)
Constitutional and legal reform (SI)
Improve governance and leadership – this is focused almost 
exclusively on political leadership (V)
Civics and political awareness raising to improve political 
accountability (SI)
Good leadership that is empowering and ‘envisioning’ (SI) Improve the status of women with particular focus on having 
women in Parliament (V)
Blend customary and modern outlooks, balancing the 
land-based culture and national identity. Challenge the rise 
in tribalism and address negative cultural practices while still 
celebrating the nation’s diversity (SI)
Increase emphasis on traditional values and knowledge; 
stronger protection of indigenous rights and issues (F)
Increase inclusivity in decision-making – of women, young 
people, people living with disabilities, people living in rural & 
remote areas (V)
Improve ethnic relations (F)
Invest significantly in infrastructure to make village life 
attractive and decrease the inequality between rural and 
urban locations (F)
Increase economic opportunities and activity, including 
greater integration with the cash economy, more employment 
opportunities and increased trade (V)
Increase development through more infrastructure and 
better quality of services, especially in locations outside the 
main urban centres (Port Vila & Luganville) (V)
Restructure the economy so that Fiji becomes less reliant 
upon imports and can be more self-sufficient. This includes 
investing in local agriculture & strengthening the village 
economy (F)
Retain well-educated and trained people to help grow 
local economy & strengthen civil society (F)
Maintain culture and language (V)
Raise education standards for all, in formal and vocational 
education and targeted literacy programs and workshops (SI)
Invest in creative arts (SI)
Increase training and skills development programs (V)
Deal with key challenges of climate change, urban drift, 
and food and land security. Natural resources need to be 
protected effectively (F)
Local to global action on climate change (SI)
Increased ownership and localisation in multiple spheres 
and a reduced reliance on foreigners (V)
Support Vanuatu industry and products, e.g. by value 
adding/manufacturing (V)
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Two strong threads emerge from discussions of what 
participants want for their countries’ future. 
First, they want to see improved governance, with a particular 
focus on lifting the quality of political leadership. In some 
cases, this was expressed in terms of a nostalgia for past 
leadership. The second is a desire for increased economic  
self-reliance. 
In Fiji, the overarching concern for participants was their 
perception that current leadership is non-consultative. Most 
expressed the belief that local knowledge is never taken 
into account in national decision-making. Despite this, it 
is evident that the participants in Fiji have a broad, holistic 
view of development. They consider the practical challenges 
associated with securing their livelihood and sustainability 
intrinsically linked to questions of political governance. 
Similarly, in Solomon Islands, participants indicated that they 
have a strong desire to ‘stop being held back’ and see politics 
as the locus of primary obstacles – political self-interest, 
corruption and limited accountability. All of these are seen as 
getting in the way of positive change, as evidenced by limited 
economic development, social and cultural expression. 
In Vanuatu, the quality of political leadership is of great 
concern. This may have been heightened during the research 
period given the advent of general elections9. 
The data also reveal the aspirations of some participants for 
their countries to become more inclusive societies in future. For 
example, responses from Solomon Islands reveal a desire to 
9 General elections will be held in Vanuatu during March 2020
achieve an improved standard of living for all (including youth, 
women, people with disabilities), prioritising youth, women 
and the most remote parts of the country; and ensuring that 
villages are active and creative places. Decentralisation is seen 
to be a vehicle for achieving these objectives.
Secondly, participants aspire to greater economic self-reliance. 
This aspiration was manifested in a number of ways including 
a desire to be less reliant on aid from development partners, 
a wish to see foreign direct investment better controlled 
and monitored and a call for a greater focus on economic 
opportunity for Pacific islanders within bilateral relationships 
and programs, especially with Australia.
In Solomon Islands, the centralisation of development in 
Honiara and one or two other centres is an issue of concern, 
as is the limited access that women and youth have to 
the benefits of development. Many see thriving villages as 
key to a successful nation and point to village change as a 
significant – and largely absent - indicator of progress. Similar 
sentiments are expressed in some of the responses obtained 
from Vanuatu.
Primary Themes Secondary Themes
Stop being held back, utilise resources better, become 
independent from aid, catalyse small business, end corruption 
(SI)
Aid funding to be disbursed at community level (V)
Strengthen bilateral relationships to make them more 
beneficial (to Vanuatu) (V)
Align aid projects with the NSDP (V)
Put limits on Chinese investment, including more control 
over where and how investment occurs in the country (V)
It can be quite depressing when you see the current level of 
leadership and governance [KIIV 005]
You can make great speeches at the United Nations but if you 
are not putting those principles into practice at home, what’s 
the point? [KIIFJ 002]
Inequality and poverty, ethnic relations, climate change 
and economic shocks are some of the major issues 
facing Fiji and will continue to do so in the future. 
The on-going outmigration of well-educated and 
trained people means that there are issues around the 
country’s capacity to meet these challenges [KIIV 009]
Solomon Islands problems should be solved by 
Solomon Islands solutions [FGSI 003]
It can be quite depressing when you see the current 
level of leadership and governance [KIIV 005]
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In Fiji, an added dimension to the desire to build an inclusive 
society stems from persistent concerns about ethnic divisions 
and long-term damage caused by Fiji’s history of political 
violence. While there is a strong sense that these are 
challenges that need to be solved in Fiji, many participants 
also said that international support to maintain and safeguard 
political stability, democracy and human rights is necessary. 
Issues of sovereignty and local ownership of development 
were significant in this data. For example, in Vanuatu, the 
NSDP (Government of Vanuatu; 2017) appears to have been 
well socialised since its development and was mentioned 
frequently10. The data reflects a belief on the part of 
respondents that the primary responsibility for taking the 
country forward rests with the state. However, there are 
numerous indications of dissatisfaction about the quality 
of current political leadership. This dissatisfaction appears 
to encompass concerns about the willingness of political 
leaderships to prioritise national interest over personal 
agendas, as well as a perception that governments do not 
have sufficient capacity to take countries to where the 
participants want them to be. Similar concerns were expressed 
by participants in Solomon Islands and Fiji.
Fiji participants recognise Fiji’s relatively high levels of 
education and high percentage of young people as key 
resources for the future, but many remain concerned about 
significant outward migration and how that might affect the 
10 Of interest, but untested, is the apparent lingering impact of the means by which the NSDP was developed which involved extensive community 
outreach consultations by staff from the Prime Minister’s Office. The impact of this type of engagement appears to have endured as evidenced by 
references to the importance of inclusive consultation around development, including that supported by aid projects
country, for example by exacerbating ‘brain drain’. On one 
level this is seen as having a negative impact on the country’s 
ability to diversify the economy and develop a stronger civil 
society. On another, people are concerned about potential 
broader demographic changes that might effectively see the 
depopulation of large parts of rural and remote Fiji. 
 The data shows that participants, particularly in Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu, see customary culture as playing a major 
role in development in the future. However, in Solomon 
Islands recent resurgence in the expression of localised 
(including provincial) identities over national ones is seen to 
pose a significant risk to the country’s future.
A point of frustration expressed by the Fiji participants was 
that the country’s leadership role and agenda for global 
change has not been reflected in positive changes at home. 
Adding to this is a concern that the economy is currently 
vulnerable and that not enough is being done to make sure 
Fiji has the capacity to deal with significant future challenges, 
including climate change, urban poverty, ethnic tensions, the 
breakdown of the sugarcane economy and a global  
economic downturn. 
Whilst the main focus here is on issues that are very much 
domestic, there is certainly an awareness of the role of 
bilateral relationships in these spheres. This is especially 
prominent in relation to the place of aid and development 
assistance. The uses and means of deployment of Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA) was a common theme in the 
discussions and often provided points of comparison between 
Australia and other bilateral partners.
In the village, ‘Life goes on’ [KIISI 009]
A majority of women in the villages are illiterate and 
live in their own world, unaware of what is happening 
with the government of the day [FGSI005]
Opportunities need to be presented to them [youth]. 
The economic aspect, but the social aspect as well, in 
terms of quality education, health ... and then a sense 
of national identity. [KIISI 005]
Western education is good. Our mistake was thinking 
that it was better than ours [KIISI 002]
We need to see the government utilising its resources 
[KIIV 008]
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There is a sense that Fiji (and other Pacific island countries) 
has a stronger international profile and more avenues for 
getting their demands met now than in the past. Some of this 
is attributed to successful political positioning in the context 
of climate change and an ability to use this issue as leverage 
to get their voices heard. The fact that the region is now 
increasingly seen as strategically important by countries other 
than Australia and New Zealand (predominantly China but 
also Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States) 
was also generally highlighted as a positive opportunity for 
Fiji and other Pacific states to be taken more seriously at the 
negotiation table. 
Many participants in Fiji had the impression that China’s 
presence was also the main reason Australia had “woken up” 
and started to take more interest in the region again. China 
is seen to have a less interventionist approach to foreign 
relations than Australia and also to be more sensitive to local 
issues and culturally specific dynamics. It is worth noting 
that there is a long-standing presence of Chinese in Fiji and 
that the relationships between “local Chinese” and Fijians 
have traditionally been strong. This may lead to many Fijians 
consequently seeing China’s interest in the region against this 
backdrop, making them inclined to take a cautiously  
optimistic approach.
It [China’s interest in the Pacific] is probably a good 
thing. Why? Because the Pacific islands could 
potentially play one against the other. From a 
geopolitics points of view. What has happened in 
recent times is that China is slowly moving in … so 
now Pacific island countries are best positioned to get 
what they want in many ways. China is giving aid. 
Australia giving aid. NZ giving aid. Europe giving aid … 
while the US went asleep for a while only now realising 
that someone else is over here now. China is giving 
infrastructure, soft loans, grants, building sporting 
complexes in Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, now that’s going to 
happen in the Solomon Islands…and it resulted in 
Australia waking up again” [KIIFJ 003]
How do you feel about your country’s current relationships with countries  
other than Australia?
Primary Themes Secondary Themes
The fact that more countries (than Australia) are showing 
an interest in the Pacific Islands is something Fiji can capitalise 
on (F)
Fiji must nurture good relationships with other Pacific 
island countries and develop a stronger regional voice (F)
Local Pacific island leaders are becoming increasingly 
confident and aware of their importance and thus better 
at negotiating (F)
Our relationships with other countries are healthy – they 
support us as a small country (V)
Solomon Islanders have long memories of foreign 
contact, going back to the Spanish and right up to RAMSI. 
The contact is seen as mostly having positive effects (SI)
Longstanding relationship with the UK, particularly 
through the Army, should be nurtured (F)
Other countries are more fortunate, advanced, 
educated (SI)
The USA is a potential trading market, particularly for 
yaqona/kava (F)
China is seen as a leading player in the region and one that 
is making significant and tangible investments (infrastructure, 
sports stadia, hotels) (F)
China has a hidden agenda when it comes to the 
relationship with Vanuatu (V)
China has made a significant contribution to infrastructure 
in Vanuatu, including in rural areas (V)
There is a benefit from having the UK/France legacy (V)
Concerns about Chinese presence in the business sector, 
including encroachment into indigenous spaces and practices 
that prompt disapproval in the community (V)
New Zealand is singled out as the country most inclusive 
of Pacific islanders (SI)
New Zealand is generally held as an equally important 
partner as Australia both historically, in the present and in 
the future. A key element here is that New Zealand is seen as 
having a much stronger understanding of, and track record of 
protecting, indigenous rights (F)
New Zealand has, particularly under the current 
government, showed a much more engaging and 
respectful approach to relations with Fiji and the Pacific than 
Australia has (F)
Foreigners need to do more to understand Solomon 
Islands culture, and not see us as ‘less developed’, 
‘primitive’ (SI)
These countries have good, genuine intentions for our country. 
It’s just the way our government leaders respond and manage 
these relationships that is important. Otherwise they might 
chase some of our traditional friends away with the way they 
are doing things. [KIISI 008]The church is almost universally the primary channel 
for engagement with people from other countries for 
Solomon Islanders as they grow up (SI)
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Sovereignty and independence are not forgotten in these 
analyses. Participants often stressed that Fiji’s leaders need to 
make decisions that are best for Fiji and the region. There is 
a strong sense that indigenous rights, in Fiji and globally, is a 
key issue that should underpin development and governance, 
highlighted by a significant number of participants who 
expressed a desire to connect more effectively with Maori and 
Indigenous Australians. 
Participants are also aware and proud of the relationships they 
have nurtured with other countries through their international 
military work and participation in national armies (UK and 
Australia) as well as on the sporting field. Many think Fiji could 
leverage more from the respect and positive reputation they 
have achieved on the back of these efforts11. 
In Solomon Islands, although Australia is often described as 
the major player, other countries are prominent including New 
Zealand, Japan, the United States and other Pacific island 
states. Foreign contact, especially as mediated into people’s 
early lives through the church, is seen to have introduced traits 
like “discipline, culture, manners and commitment”. 
11 Fiji’s Defence Minister has recently suggested that the creation of a ‘Pacific Regiment’ in the Australian Defence Forces, made up of Pacific islands 
personnel, would be a tangible way to strengthen regional ties. (Boyle; 2019)
12 The British Solomon Islands Protectorate was established in the south of the present country in 1893 and ended with the country’s independence in 
1978.
The Protectorate years are remembered by participants as 
a time of good governance12. However, negative effects, 
like interfaith rivalries, the suppression of customary culture 
in some churches, the destruction of sandalwood forests 
(and contemporary resource extraction) and the intrusion of 
negative aspects of popular culture are also recognised.
The question of China and Taiwan was raised frequently 
in interviews and focus group discussions. Taiwan was 
universally well regarded, however, some participants were 
concerned about China’s potential influence. A great deal of 
criticism was directed towards the way in which the Solomon 
Islands government made the decision to switch away from 
recognition of Taiwan.
In discussions around bilateral relationships, other than the 
relationship with Australia, the impacts of the relationship 
with the China were frequently raised in the data from 
Vanuatu. A range of reactions and perceptions, positive, 
negative and neutral, were shared by participants. Concerns 
about Chinese influence are focused around issues that 
intersect with domestic concerns – protection of reserved 
businesses, local content in large projects, working conditions 
on Chinese projects and in Chinese businesses. The issue of 
debt was of lesser concern and the prospect of China wanting 
to set up a military base in Vanuatu is of negligible concern.
Participants in Vanuatu also noted that the colonial legacy 
of France and the UK is still very present and continuing 
relationships with these countries are largely seen as 
beneficial. New Zealand, Japan and the United States 
were also identified as countries with significant bilateral 
relationships in the Pacific. 
Militarisation is not imminent and it’s not even a mid-
term liability, but we’ve got roads now. We’ve got 
roads where we had no roads before and people in 
the islands who are the beneficiaries are unequivocal 
about it and they are unanimous in their praise and 
their affection for the people that brought them the 
roads and that’s not nothing, that’s a really big deal 
[KIIV 009]
The US is trying to come in but has a long way to 
come. I think it’s left Vanuatu for too long and now 
that China’s coming in it’s really seeing that as a threat 
and it’s trying its very best to try and revive its relations 
with Vanuatu [KIIV 008]
The church is the first developer of the Solomon 
Islands. The churches had the boats and ships. [KIISI 
003]
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Primary Themes Secondary Themes
Fiji and the Pacific island region more broadly are 
becoming more prominent actors on the world stage (F)
Stable relationships with South-Eastern Asian archipelago 
countries (SI)
Fiji should strengthen regional institutions and foster 
stronger relationships with other Pacific island countries 
(F)
Need for more transparency in government-to-
government agreements (V)
Strong, friendly ties with a range of countries that are 
complementary to Solomon Islands interests: An ‘oceanic 
agenda for the future’ (SI)
Protect the environment and address climate change (SI)
Mitigate the risk of future conflict through deeper 
international relationships (SI)
Address basic issues like sanitation, non-communicable 
diseases (SI)
There needs to be stronger relationships between Fiji’s 
civil society and international actors (F)
China is here to stay (F) Protect Melanesian values from erosion by Chinese 
influence (V)
Proceed carefully and closely scrutinise the relationship 
with China (SI)
Land can only be leased by Joint Ventures to minimise 
alienation of land (V)
Stronger relationships between Fiji and indigenous 
peoples globally (but particularly in New Zealand and 
Australia) (F)
VIPA needs to be strengthened to only allow good foreign 
investment into the country (V)
Reserved businesses to be protected for ni-Vanuatu people 
(V)
Address capacity gaps through more commercial 
partnerships (SI)
I don’t know how far Australia is supporting us with 
infrastructure but I think that is where China is good at it  
[KIIV 002]
China is listening and looking, observing [KIIV 003]
The Pacific Islands is a very important region for the world for 
many reasons. Whether it is for our marine resources, or as our 
individual voices in the UN. From a geopolitical point of view 
we are very interesting [KIIFJ 003].
There should partnerships rather than the company outside 
coming, taking the cream of the cake and taking it outside 
… Ensure that money remains in the country and expertise is 
passed on [KIISI 007]
We need to redefine what regionalism is…when we talk 
about our issues here in the Pacific and Fiji…how do we 
define ourselves in the region right now? Do we influence 
the Pacific in the right way? Do we have a model like that of 
Ratu Kamisese Mara that talked about ‘The Pacific Way’? We 
are losing that Fijian leadership and I think we are also losing 
out to the other Pacific island countries. They are all getting 
stronger in their traditional identities and that is missing in Fiji 
[KIIFJ 005].
How would you like relationships with countries other than Australia to  
look in the future? 
The Fiji data in particular reflects that the current historical moment is one in which Australia’s dominant role in the Pacific island 
region is challenged by other international actors. Pacific island countries are growing in confidence to dictate at least some of the 
terms on which the region engages with global actors. This position was articulated most clearly in the Fiji data. Participants see this 
is an opportunity for Fiji and other Pacific island countries to develop a regional position on key issues and articulate their interests 
more clearly in negotiations with a series of actors. 
In Fiji, relationships within the region – through organisations such as the MSG and PIF – appear to be those that are of most 
immediate concern for the participants. This reflects the view that Fiji is a natural leader in the region with a responsibility to act and 
talk in a way that benefits other, smaller, Pacific island countries. However, there is some concern that Fiji has not done enough to 
build and maintain strong regional relationships on local terms but has instead been too focused on nurturing a global profile for 
their own benefit.
In Solomon Islands, the (very new) relationship with China dominated discussion, but concern was directed more towards the 
Solomon Islands government. Participants expressed very little confidence that the present government will act in the long-term best 
interests of Solomon Islanders. Several participants observed that regional solidarity between Pacific island states, New Zealand and 
Australia could be an important way to manage the relationship with China. 
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Also in Solomon Islands, there is some feeling – expressed more vis-a-vis Australia – that the Tensions could have been averted if 
deeper, more trusting and responsive relationships had been in place. For these participants, reducing the risk of a resurgence of 
violence is a priority for relationships with long-standing friends. The role of China (or perhaps the government’s actions in that 
regard) are seen as a potentially significant driver of conflict.
In Vanuatu, the relationship with China also dominated responses to this question. Responses appear to be largely informed by an 
increased presence of Chinese people and businesses, including in places that have been almost exclusively occupied by indigenous 
people to date, as well as making inroads into sectors of the economy that are reserved for indigenous investors. The greatest levels 
of negative responses arise where these recent developments clash with pre-existing local concerns such as livelihood opportunities. 
This may be influenced by the lack of opportunity to participate in a cash economy which is a longstanding challenge in Vanuatu, as 
well as elsewhere in the region.
How do you feel about your country’s current relationship with Australia?13
13 In this table, bold entries are primary themes, plain text ones are secondary.
A Sea of Islands meeting the Belt and Road [KIISI 011]
Australia does not understand the 
Pacific well and their engagement 
is largely only based on their own 
priorities and ambitions and not 
what Pacific island communities 
need and desire (F)
Australia is a very strong presence 
and influence in Vanuatu (V)
There is a long-standing, strong 
and deep relationship between 
Australians and Fijians that is largely 
maintained through people-to-
people relations (Pacific island 
diaspora in Australia, Australian 
tourists in Fiji, sports connections, 
business relations) and aid (F)
Interactions with Australians (in 
multiple spheres) are overshadowed 
by poor attitude and approach (V)
Australia has taken its role in the 
Pacific islands for granted for too 
long and are now in a position 
where their role has to be redefined 
and remade (F)
Australia is the ‘big brother’, with 
clear moral and strategic imperatives 
to help the Solomon Islands. We are 
so close (SI)
Australians are perceived as being 
dominant, remote, sometimes racist 
(SI)
Solomon Islands is losing sight of, taking 
for granted the value of the relationship 
with Australia and New Zealand (SI)
The relationship with Australia is 
overwhelmingly viewed as being 
positive for Vanuatu (V)
Australia is a racist country and much 
of their engagement with Pacific island 
communities is framed by this (F)
Australia’s engagement is a reaction 
to China (V)
At present Australia is not doing 
enough for the region, highlighted 
by their lack of action on climate 
change and their own human 
rights record. Many current policy 
initiatives are based on tokenism 
rather than genuinely important, 
structural changes (F)
Australia’s engagement is a reaction to 
China (F)
Australia’s main and most tangible 
contribution in Fiji and for Fijians has 
been in creating job opportunities 
(in Fiji through development projects 
and investment and via working visa 
opportunities to Australia) (F)
Australia is not seen to support the 
Pacific island states on things that really 
matter on the international stage (F)
Dealing with the Department of 
Foreign Affairs & Trade (DFAT) is too 
complex (V)
Negative Neutral Positive
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The data from all three countries indicate that bilateral relationships with Australia are strong, long-standing and multi-faceted. They 
go beyond government-to-government engagement and permeate almost all areas of life in the target countries. Whilst there are 
numerous similarities in how these relationships manifest, they are not uniform. 
For example, the data from Fiji makes reference to military ties, which do not apply in the other two countries. Sporting connections 
are also more developed. Fijians perceived their skills and abilities in rugby league and rugby union as highly recognised in Australia. 
Sport is highlighted as a major arena for interaction between Fiji and Australia and a space where Fijians have opportunities to 
flourish. 
In Solomon Islands, the impact and legacy of RAMSI is of particular significance. Even though many participants expressed a feeling 
that Australia could have played a role in avoiding the Tensions, and there are aspects of RAMSI that are critiqued, it is overall a 
significant asset in the relationship. Vanuatu’s strong presence in the Seasonal Workers Program (SWP) adds a dimension to the 
relationship that is not as strongly felt in the other countries. In each country, Australia’s influence and impact as a first responder 
at times of natural disaster and as an ongoing development partner is recognised as the dominant aspect of the relationship, 
particularly in the civil society sector and in non-urban areas.
Participants were able and willing to point to various aspects of the relationship their country has with Australia which cause 
concern, frustration and, at times, resentment. The responses reveal a complex picture
 
It is an interesting time for Australia in terms of redefining its role in the Pacific. [KIIFJ 001]
There is a lack of localisation in 
Australian projects (V)
Ambivalence about the role of 
Australian aid and Australian Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
– recognition and gratitude for the 
work that has been done in myriad 
sectors (especially RAMSI), but 
concerns about aid coordination and 
a lack of transparency around the 
work of INGOs (SI)
There is a lack of localisation in 
Australian projects (F)
Too much reliance on International NGOs 
(INGOs), crowding out local NGOs/Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs)/Faith-Based 
Organisations (FBOs)/Community-Based 
Organisation (CBOs)s (V)
Visa restrictions are frustrating and 
demeaning (SI)
Labour mobility is generally viewed as 
positive (V)
Visas and ease of travel are sticking 
points in how this relationship is viewed 
(V)
Commercial relationships are weak and 
transactional. Partnerships incorporating 
mentorship and capacity building are 
needed (SI)
Awareness that Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people are missing from 
the relationship (SI)
There is interest/concern in relation to 
indigenous Australians and how they are 
regarded and treated (also their absence 
is noted) (V)
The blackbirding legacy and the way 
Australian South Sea Islanders (ASSI) 
people are treated are concerns (V)
The history is mixed, going back to 
blackbirding, failure to act to prevent 
the Tensions, a tendency to heavy-
handedness and transactional rather 
than deeper relationships (SI)
Suspicion around cultural agendas - gay 
rights, negative popular culture (SI)
They [Australians] talk about us in a way 
that’s not good [KIIV 007]
You can ‘understand’ the politics and the context, but it’s actually understanding the 
cultural context, the social context, even the faith-based context, that is important. 
And in order to understand that you need to give the space and voice to Pacific 
people [KIIFJ 002].
Negative Neutral Positive
25
The criticisms range from particular concerns about the way 
Australian people behave or are perceived to behave when 
in the target countries, through to more generalised critiques 
of Australian domestic policy and how that is seen to colour 
Pacific engagement. For example, in Fiji, village-based focus 
groups were predominantly positive towards Australia and 
Australians, whereas key informants who were Suva-focused 
were more critical. 
A particular area of concern was around a lack of localisation 
in Australian aid projects14. This was reflected in criticisms of 
the work of INGOs, including how they share information 
and resources with local NGOs, the lack of employment 
opportunities for Pacific islands people within those 
organisations and their failure to appreciate and make 
appropriate use of local knowledge, skills, and expertise. This 
was expressed in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu with particular 
reference to issues of aid coordination and transparency.
In Fiji, while there is a strong recognition of the importance 
of Australian aid and support, the overall perspective of 
participants is that Australia lacks a genuine interest in 
Pacific island communities, fails to recognise the resources 
available in Fiji and does not do enough to support the further 
development of local capacities. It is telling that while most 
participants report having good relationships with individual 
Australian people or specific Australian organisations there is 
widespread discontent with the broader structural relationship 
with Australia. 
Participants in Solomon Islands said that locals are made to 
feel inferior to foreign consultants through a combination 
of attitude and pay differentials. A major exception to this 
appears to be programs targeted at women and people with 
disabilities, which are characterised by patience and concern 
on the part of the (Australian) personnel associated with their 
delivery and implementation. Many reported improvement 
14 See, also, Flint, Duituturaga & Jirauni (2018).
15 March 2015
16 It is significant to note that participants made very few references to the ‘Pacific Australia Card’ that was announced as part of the Pacific Step-up by 
the Australian Prime Minister during the November 2018 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting (SBS; 2018).
17 It is possible that the frustration with the visa process is exacerbated in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu because applications from those countries have 
to be processed in Fiji. They have no point of contact with the Australian government in their own countries for visa issues.
in Australian engagement, particularly through more recent 
initiatives from the Australian High Commission. 
In Vanuatu, concerns about Australian over-use of INGOs 
to deliver the aid program almost certainly reflects the 
rapid expansion in the visibility of these organisations post 
Tropical Cyclone Pam15, especially in rural areas where they 
had a much smaller presence previously. The lack of sharing 
of resources with local NGOs has led to a perception that 
local NGOs were being crowded out. Participants were also 
concerned that these foreign entities (and by association/proxy 
‘Australia’) were seen to be driving the agenda rather than 
either the government of Vanuatu or local communities.
The issue of visa restrictions that affect Pacific islanders’ ability 
to travel to Australia was a point of concern for participants in 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu16, with reference to this being 
something that was considered demeaning and a source of 
frustration17. This issue seems to be felt by all levels of society, 
as it has also been raised by Pacific island leaders on numerous 
occasions, including during Prime Minister Morrison’s visit to 
Vanuatu in January 2019 (Newton Cain; 2019b).
 
A striking issue to emerge from the research was participants’ 
perceptions of Australian Indigenous issues. They reflected 
a sense of unease as to how white Australia engages with 
people of colour at home, with a clear indication that this is 
seen to be significant for how Australia projects itself in the 
region. A secondary theme that emerged from the Fiji and 
Solomon Islands data is that many participants felt a natural 
affinity to Indigenous Australians and that they wanted more 
opportunities to build these relationships. Some of the distrust 
about Australia’s real intentions and ideologies, including 
racism, may stem from the treatment of Aboriginals in 
Australia rather than Australian conduct in the Pacific per se. 
In Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, participants made reference 
to the absence of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
– their cousins – from the bilateral relationship and from 
Layered over and stifled by a degree of parochialism 
that is not only unnecessary, it’s counter-productive 
[KIIV 009]
It’s a fact – there is a big country right next door, 
in the neighbourhood, the big brother. It’s just that 
sometimes in the family the big brother’s got his own 
agendas [that are] not in the interests of the other 
siblings. [KIISI 005]
Australia hasn’t done enough. They still see us in the 
Pacific as people to be helped…that we have nothing 
of value to offer. [KIIFJ 004]
Australia needs to show the political will to do 
something and unless they do that the Pacific Island 
countries will say: hey look, you’re not doing enough. 
Your actions don’t speak. [KIIFJ 003]
I haven’t really followed Australia’s engagement with 
the Pacific in recent years because there is little of 
substance…that is not to criticize the people working 
locally but they are often working on small budgets 
and with little support from their own governments. 
[KIIFJ 008]
They come in and just decide on activities and decide 
on whoever they felt like giving that responsibility to. 
They need to come down to people’s level.  
[FGV: Outer island]
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engagement with Australians18. This important point needs to 
be viewed in conjunction with the perception of Australia as 
a racist country and how this affects engagement with Pacific 
island countries and Pacific people.
Economic relationships were less significant in response to 
this question than elsewhere. However, in Solomon Islands, 
participants indicated that they see commercial links as 
being limited and transactional. In addition, there was some 
ambivalence towards labour mobility schemes. The PLS is well 
regarded, but the SWP received some criticism19. On the other 
hand, others observed that the more responsible workers 
were better able to save effectively through the scheme.
More than one participant drew a line from blackbirding to 
the schemes. 
18 There have been some very recent and apparently positive developments in this regard, including the participation of Indigenous entertainer Sean 
Choolburra, in the 2020 Australia Day celebrations in Port Vila and similar events in Honiara in recent years.
19 This is noteworthy given the very low participation of Solomon Islands in the SWP and the PLS to date. In 2018-2019, 20 Solomon Islanders (out of 
203 in total) participated in the PLS and 314 (out of 12,200) in the SWP (Howes & Lawton; 2019)
Over and above these substantive issues, a shared concern 
about relationships with Australia and Australians is one 
of ‘tone’. This is reflected throughout the data, not only 
in response to this question. In Fiji and Solomon Islands, 
participants noted that they consider Australia to be a racist 
country and that this frames Australia’s engagement with 
the Pacific. In Fiji, participants reflected an overall sense that 
Australia’s approach is, at times, overbearing, paternalistic 
and, as a consequence, ineffective. In Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu, participants referred to a perception of Australia’s 
tendency to heavy-handedness when it comes to engaging 
with their countries. This was seen as being coupled with 
the adoption of a transactional approach to the bilateral 
relationship rather than a focus on developing deeper 
relationships. In Solomon Islands, comparisons with New 
Zealand were made often, with New Zealanders commonly 
regarded as being far more willing and able to engage with 
Solomon Islanders on their own terms. Australians are often 
seen as being aloof and unwilling to trust in the capability of 
Solomon Islanders.
The labour mobility scheme is designed in a more 
recent labour market phenomenon. It is not a shared 
relationship. There are stringent rules on repatriations 
and remittances. More of it is to your advantage than 
it is to our advantage. It is a transactional relationship. 
[KIISI 001]
Why are you asking us to be partners with you if 
you are keeping an eagle eye on us as if we are not 
capable? [KIISI 009]
If you look at places in New South Wales and 
Queensland where there was indentured slavery, we 
South Sea Islanders did not prosper as the Indian slaves 
did elsewhere. We got thrown out. We can claim 
ownership to the building and growing of some of 
these regions of Australia – North Queensland, some of 
New South Wales. [KIISI 001]
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How would you like your country’s relationship with Australia to look in the future?
Primary Themes Secondary Themes
Needs to be based on a genuine partnership between 
Australia and Fiji, focusing on reciprocity and collaboration, 
not just Australia’s fleeting interests in the region. (F)
The relationship has to be a real one – a partnership of 
equals (V)
Vanuatu to make its own decisions about governance and 
security (V)
Want a strong partnership with a long-term partner; built on 
recognition that the two countries need each other (SI)
Australia needs to take into account that their priorities 
might not be shared by Pacific island countries and stay 
out of internal affairs in these countries (F)
Policies and programs are to be owned and driven by 
Vanuatu (NSDP) (V)
DFAT and others need to be better at utilising local people 
to solve local problems (F)
Solomon Islanders want to build links with Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people (SI)
Increased focus on people-to-people links (via ministerial 
visits, scholarships, military links, sports) (V)
The relationship needs to mature – to become an economic 
partnership (trade/increased labour mobility/opportunities for 
skilled employment for ni-Vanuatu people in Australia) (V)
More needs to be done to support the Solomon Islands 
private sector (SI)
Australia needs to engage more with local communities 
and civil society to develop a better understanding of what 
people (not just the government) need and want (F)
Deeper community level engagement (SI)
Development and aid projects should be focused on local 
communities rather than go through the government (F)
Focus on funding local NGOs/CSOs rather than INGOs (V)
Investments need to focus on local capacity building and 
supporting locally driven initiatives (F)
Greater recognition of capabilities of ni-Vanuatu people 
and more focus on them being the ones to deliver projects (V)
Fijians need to see real, tangible results of Australia’s 
engagement – such as easier visa options to visit Australia 
and better market access for Fiji products (F)
Visa reform (SI)
The main thing Australia could do for Fiji is to take action on 
climate change (F)
Australia has more to do as a regional leader (SI)
As the largest closest neighbour, Australia will remain a major 
force and influence in Fiji. Improved relationships would mean 
Australia providing more capacity building and infrastructural 
support for Fiji [KIIFJ 006]
Everybody knows about the Aborigines – it’s in the books and 
that. But nobody has seen them live, in terms of an Aborigine 
coming to visit. Very few and far between in terms of that 
connection [KIISI 005]
Can Australia just show us the respect and take the climate 
seriously? [KIIFJ 007].
While we respect the relationship they are giving we want a 
genuine relationship [FGV: Outer island]
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When it comes to hopes for the future of relationships with 
Australia, the data from all three countries reveal a desire 
for relationships that are genuine partnerships. Participants 
told us that they are looking for relationships based on 
reciprocity – of interest, of respect, and of trust – with a 
focus on collaboration to address shared challenges. In other 
words, people are looking to have relationships that are 
conducted in ways that are resonant with Pacific islanders; 
that are a ‘Pacific Mode’ of working together. Much of the 
data that was captured in response to this question builds 
on responses to the previous question. Participants want the 
future relationship to be one where the positive aspects of 
the current relationship are amplified and where the problems 
that they see are addressed to the mutual benefit of all 
concerned. Furthermore, participants in Fiji and Solomon 
Islands said that they wanted to see more engagement 
with local communities and civil society by Australia and 
Australians20. The data from Fiji and Vanuatu also reflects 
participants’ concerns that Australia should stay out of the 
internal affairs of those countries. 
Participants are acutely aware that their countries are reliant 
upon Australian aid and development support but express 
frustration that much of what is received is not appropriately 
targeted, culturally appropriate, or delivered in collaboration 
with local communities. Fiji participants think Australia could 
contribute much more to nurture and develop local capacities 
that can be utilised more consistently in Fiji. The desire for 
more localisation also appeared in the data from Vanuatu.
Another key theme is that Australia needs to engage with 
Fiji and the broader region on Pacific terms. This appears 
to reflect concerns around respect and reciprocity that are 
recurring values brought up in responses – a shared set of 
values that together may form part of the ‘Pacific Mode.’
Similarly, other participants expressed a desire for Australia to 
engage with Pacific countries and Pacific islands people on 
their own terms and with a better understanding of Pacific 
cultural norms and modes of engagement.
There is some ambiguity in the data about how Australia 
can best deal with Fiji on a political and diplomatic level. 
Some participants indicated that Australia needed to work 
constructively with Fiji to make sure they continued to move 
towards a fully participatory democracy, help safeguard 
the current Constitution and improve the human rights 
situation. Others clearly stated that Australia needed to stay 
out of internal affairs and engage with Fiji without specific 
conditions. It is possible that these differing approaches follow 
local political fault-lines. 
20 Some initiatives under the Pacific Step-up such as the PacificAus Sports Partnership and the Pacific Church Partnership Program may appear to address 
concerns of this type, however they were not mentioned by the participants in this research.
21 In general discussion the two are not necessarily distinguished and often a shorthand term of ‘picking apples’ is used to encompass seasonal work, 
regardless of which country it takes place in or what the actual work is.
The invisibility of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
to participants is emblematic of the distance that is seen to 
exist between Solomon Islands and Australia. Participants 
reported that Solomon Islanders want to know an Australia 
that is multicultural with Indigenous Australians at its heart. 
They see and value the ethnic and cultural ties that link them 
to black Australians across the island chains.
This exemplifies the thirst for mutual knowledge, 
understanding and respect that was common among 
participants – they won’t truly know and trust Australia until 
they know Aboriginal Australia. And the relationship needs to 
go deeper than government – there should be opportunities 
for Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians and Solomon 
Islanders to know each other at all levels. 
In Vanuatu, the focus on a desire for an economic partnership 
indicates a desire for self-reliance on the part of participants. 
Vanuatu’s experience as a sending country to the SWP and 
Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme21 is largely 
considered to be a positive one and this may well be 
informing a desire for more opportunities, including for 
skilled employment, for example via the PLS. However, it is 
important to note that there is no expressed desire to migrate 
permanently to Australia.
I look forward to the day when I see Pacific islander 
and Fijian consultants on externally funded projects 
and when I see a clear, locally based succession plan 
being integrated into project- or organisation funding. 
NGOs have to be sustainable –they need to develop the 
resources and competencies to run without external 
funding after the initial phase. [KIIFJ 001]
There are already affinities there that we should put 
into a syllabus: Australia there, the Aborigines, South 
Sea Islanders, Bougainville… So we can say ‘oh yes, 
Australia is not a white country, it is one of us, it is part 
of us. So we can come and talk in your institutions…’ 
[KIISI 011]
I would like Australia to understand the world from our 
point of view, understand what we see as important 
for a Fijian community and household … that it’s not 
about wealth but about the intangible things we value 
[KIIFJ 004]
As a Pacific islander, these are our countries, this is our 
place. Whatever countries want to do to help us should 
be something that is beneficial for us but also creating 
relationships. That is what our culture is all about, 
creating lasting relationships, not just to fulfil their own 
agendas and leave us. [KIISI 008]
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How can your country work to improve the relationship with Australia?
Primary Themes Secondary Themes
Good, stable government and a culture of democracy 
across all levels of society (F)
Government needs to liaise with all the people in Vanuatu 
to better inform conversations with Australia (V)
Improve standards of governance and leadership (V) Don’t allow the new relationship with China to affect 
relationships with long lasting partners (SI)
Ensure that the government is more accountable and 
responsible, less corrupt (SI)
Facilitate negotiations between local CSOs, INGOs and 
the Vanuatu government to make changes about how 
funding is allocated and who delivers programs (V)
Be more assertive and negotiate better (V)
Development should be be driven from the community 
level, however, that is contingent on investment in local 
human resources as well as a commitment to a free and well-
supported civil sector (F)
Fiji needs to engage young people, who are the country’s main 
resource for future development, in public consultation and 
decision-making. This calls for a cultural change where cultural 
values regarding respect for authority and elders do not get in 
the way of getting the best out of the young as a resource.  
[KII FJ001]Local leaders will have to be more honest and 
outspoken, as well as more confident and assertive, when 
dealing with Australia (and other countries) (F)
Take responsibility for own future. Build civil awareness of 
the political process, unite the nation (SI)
For an economy to grow we must have strong institutions. And 
then state and society must grow together – strong institutions 
and educated societies [KIISI 001]
Develop a more diverse and flexible business sector as 
well as build stronger relationships between business and civil 
society (F)
The question of what is required on the part of the target countries to achieve better relationships with Australia prompted some of the 
strongest levels of convergence across the three target populations. Participants in all three countries referenced the need for strong 
democratic institutions and good government at home in order to take the bilateral relationships with Australia to the desired level. 
When it comes to what is required on the part of the target countries and their leaderships to improve bilateral relationships with 
Australia, participants in Fiji and Vanuatu responded that they felt that their local leaders needed to be more honest, outspoken 
and assertive. In addition, in Fiji and Solomon Islands participants indicated that the private sector was part of how the bilateral 
relationship could be improved in the future. They identified a need for their countries to develop more diverse and flexible business 
sectors and for there to be stronger relationships between business and civil society in the domestic sphere. Furthermore, participants 
from all three of the countries expressed the need for their own governments to invest in local human resources and demonstrate a 
real commitment to a free and well-supported civil sector. 
It is interesting to note that the focus of these expectations or aspirations is on what can be done in the domestic sphere. There 
was no reference to investment in greater resources to be deployed overseas, for example by opening more diplomatic missions or 
increasing resources to existing ones. This domestic focus is in keeping with the broad themes of responses across the board.
30
How can Australia work to improve the relationship with your country?
Primary Themes Secondary Themes
Show more respect for Pacific island stakeholders and be 
better at listening to local needs (F)
Recognise the contribution that South Sea Islanders 
made to Australia through blackbirding (SI)
Develop more coherent, long-term strategies for engaging 
with the Pacific rather than focus on case-based projects (F)
Develop and support Pacific media content to increase 
knowledge about the region (F)
Allow Solomon Islands to determine its own 
development pathway, find the middle ground and deepen 
people-to-people connections (SI)
Open up the market for Fijian products (such as dalo/taro 
and yaqona/kava) (F)
Reform the ways that INGOs and local NGOs work 
together (SI)
Demonstrate more trust in local partners (SI)
Work more closely with local communities and civil society 
to develop succession plans and build capacity locally (F)
Work only with local CSOs and not INGOs (V)
Be better at utilising local knowledge and resources in 
the development and delivery of programs (F)
Support women’s leadership in the Pacific (F)
Improve on localisation – Technical Advisers (TA) should 
come in, transfer knowledge/skills and leave; make more use 
of local TAs (V)
Prioritise links with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people (SI)
Create more formal employment opportunities and 
skills development, including more diverse scholarship 
opportunities (SI)
Continue cooperation in law and order & security, 
including human security (SI)
Ease visa restrictions and strengthen working-visa programs 
for Fiji citizens (F)
Open more doors to ni-Vanuatu people to work in 
Australia beyond SWP – Australia Pacific Training Coalition 
(APTC) graduates and skilled workers (V)
Lessen visa and immigration restrictions: Let Pacific 
islanders ‘arrive with dignity’ (SI)
Respect ni-Vanuatu people more (V)
Improve process for obtaining a visa to visit Australia or 
do away with the visa altogether (V)
Economic investment strategies need to move with the 
times and address key issues in contemporary Fiji (F)
Invest in Solomon Islands business opportunities, in 
partnership with locals (SI)
I was disappointed when the investment into Pacific Islands 
media [from Australia] was to be the provisioning of television 
programs…I really don’t need to see The Bachelor or Married at 
First Sight. That amount of money could actually have been given 
to local media organisations to produce content [KIIFJ 002].
Do more than take the cheaper, easy route on climate change 
(SI)
Do more on the big issues – climate change and 
infrastructure projects benefitting the region (F)
Australia has been very generous in setting aside 3 billion 
dollars for the Pacific. One billion aid and the rest for 
infrastructure and development, and that’s good. But it’s a 
token. Australia needs to do more on climate change and for 
the Pacific islands [KIIFJ 003]
I would expect the leaders and influential people in Australia 
to be setting an example for us [KIIV 005]
We need a lot more trade and investment between us, prioritising links with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. Don’t start 
in Canberra – start in Queensland. Follow the frothings on the sea, where the canoe paddles [KIISI 011]
[I am disappointed at] the lack of knowledge of the government and its role in the country. The majority of the youths I 
work with have no idea even about the national general elections. [FGSI 005]
I am quite optimistic about the future, but then again you need to work for it. [KIISI 008]
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The primary area of convergence in relation to this question 
was the need to make better use of local knowledge and 
resources by those who are implementing programs on 
behalf of the Australian government. This extends from the 
design of programs and projects through to their delivery. 
This primary concern encapsulates other concerns such as 
lack of employment opportunities for local people within 
Australian programs and reports by local NGOs and CSOs 
of restricted access to funding. The data across all three 
countries reflect mixed feelings around the role of INGOs. 
While their work is acknowledged and, largely, appreciated, 
there is some concern about the displacement of local 
organisations. Some INGOs, working with local partners, 
are not timely in providing funds and feedback, and are 
perceived to pass on onerous reporting requirements. 
Connected to this issue is the concern about the quality of 
relationships between Australia and Pacific island countries, 
and between Australians and Pacific islanders. The participants 
indicated that more needs to be done on the Australian side 
to develop these relationships in ways that are respectful, 
sustainable and mutually beneficial. Across each country, 
participants indicated that they felt it was important that 
Australia and Australians should demonstrate respect for 
local people and culture and be better at listening. For 
example, in Solomon Islands, although participants place first 
responsibility on their own country to solve its own problems, 
they have many specific recommendations for Australia. 
Central among these is the active creation of multidimensional 
relationships in which the wishes of Solomon Islanders are 
respected and balanced against those of the Australians. 
Similarly, in Fiji there is a sense that Australia consistently 
ignores the issues that concern most Fijians both on the 
grand scale (climate change) and on the detailed policy level 
(visa restrictions and labour mobility schemes). It is evident 
that most respondents did not necessarily see Australia as 
a place they wanted to migrate to permanently, but rather 
a place they wanted to engage with economically – that is, 
do trade with, gain education in or work in temporarily. 
22 The other main issue is the removal of the ban on commercial importation of kava. A trial of commercial importation of kava to Australia is due to 
commence during 2020 (Fox; 2019)
Many participants said that Australia needs to ease visa 
restrictions and strengthen working visa programs. This 
‘strengthening’ includes both increasing the number 
of opportunities available and investing in how the 
programs operate in order to maximise benefits to 
Pacific workers and minimise risks associated with 
poor working conditions and other abuses. 
The emphasis on ease of access to Australia should not 
come as a surprise. It is a sticking point and a source of 
frustration in numerous Pacific island countries. The main 
cause of concern is the administrative (and concomitant) 
financial burden that the process of obtaining a visa entails. 
It is a particular issue in the Vanuatu context as visa free 
access to Australia has been stipulated by the government 
as a precondition for ratification of the Pacific Agreement on 
Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus22. In Solomon Islands, 
some participants identified discriminatory treatment at the 
port of entry to Australia as another aspect of this issue.
Another key theme to emerge from this part of the data 
focused on how Australia can do more to enhance economic 
opportunity. Participants in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 
identified that creating more opportunities for formal 
employment was an important way in which Australia could 
contribute to an enhanced future relationship. Issues related 
to scholarships and training were also raised. Participants 
in Solomon Islands indicated that the current profile of 
scholarships which are oriented towards public-sector related 
skills is perceived as too narrow. Business and entrepreneurial 
skills, and arts/cultural skills are also valued and sought after.
More generally, participants in Fiji and Solomon Islands 
expressed a desire for Australia to do more on ‘big’ issues 
such as addressing the causes of climate change and 
investment in infrastructure projects that benefit the region. 
Particularly noticeable in the data from Solomon Islands was 
that many participants see a need for Australia to come to 
terms with its own past if it wishes to be a true partner. 
Remove the visa requirement, to allow South Seas 
countries to be able to have access to a region that 
they helped to develop. … let us work on those 
values of history to gain a foothold in the way that we 
develop these two societies together [KIISI 001]
There’s a lot that Australia has to do better. Climate 
change for example. It is staring us in the face. I come 
from an island where every day you walk with your feet 
wet. Is Australia doing much in that area? Perhaps not 
much [KIISI 006]
I see that those countries who want to help us mitigate 
climate change are really friends for us [KIISI 008]
You have to think positive. And this is the country that 
we live in, regardless of what other people say about 
it. They don’t live here. We live here. Some of the 
descriptions that have been labelled to our country, 
they don’t help either. And some of the reports that 
have been written by those that make reports do not 
help us either. So one wonders what exactly are they 
trying to do when they do those reports, those reviews, 
those consultancy reports and all of that. Sometimes I 
read it and I don’t recognise my country [KIISI 003]
Compensation for the blackbirding is not right, its’s 
just a one-off payment and that’s why it’s not suitable. 
We need to be recognized that it was our ancestors 
that were chained and taken to Australia and built 
Australia. Recognition or acknowledgement is better 
than compensation [Minority FGSI 003]
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Key Messages & 
Recommendations
What key messages emerged from  
the data? 
Quality relationships matter more than 
quantities of aid, trade or other 
engagement. 
One thing that comes across loud and clear from all of our 
data is the very high value that is placed on the relationships 
with Australia and Australians by the participants in this 
research. We use the term ‘relationships’ deliberately because 
this is a space characterised by connections that are many and 
varied. They are not confined to capital cities or one particular 
sector. They span education, sport, commerce, cultural 
exchanges, faith linkages, diplomatic engagements, and 
much more. In each of the countries where we worked, it was 
clear that Australia’s presence is one that is wanted. Indeed, 
it is the importance of the relationship that underpins 
participants’ criticisms of how Australia engages – 
participants desire to see the relationship not just 
preserved but enhanced. What could be seen as a 
contradiction – the support for Australian relationships 
and detailed criticism – in fact speaks to the desire 
among Pacific islanders for these relationships to 
realise their full potential.
A key theme expressed across the board is a desire for 
relationships to be deepened and developed in ways that 
speak to their quality rather than quantity. This includes, but 
is not limited to, moving beyond the portrayal of bilateral 
relationships in one-dimensional terms, whether by reference 
to aid, security, or some other paradigm. 
The data nonetheless indicate a strong thread of 
wariness about Australia’s motives and its conduct 
within its Pacific relationships. Participants told us that 
they want Australia to fully embrace being a member of the 
Pacific family. This includes taking on a share of responsibility 
as the region’s largest and wealthiest country. Participants 
were mindful of the considerable and extensive assistance 
that Australia has provided to the region over many years. 
However, there appears to be a mismatch between the 
number of Australian programs, projects, and initiatives 
(some of which predate the Step-up) and the infrequency 
with which they were referenced by the people we listened 
to. Very few programs and their dollar value were raised by 
the research participants: notable exceptions were labour 
mobility programs, APTC, Pacific Women Shaping Pacific 
Development and RAMSI.
There is a sense of sadness and frustration (bordering 
on resentment at times) about the ways in which 
Australia and Australians are seen to behave in relation 
to Pacific island countries and towards Pacific island 
people. The obstacles that face Pacific island people who 
wish to visit Australia present a particular sticking point. There 
were numerous observations of high-handedness, racism and 
limited cultural competence. This research would indicate 
that Australia’s forms and style of interaction appear to align 
poorly with the ‘Pacific Mode’.
At an institutional level, this sadness and frustration was 
reflected in very strong concerns about the lack of local 
ownership and participation in Australian engagement across 
government, civil society and private sector relations. At the 
government-to-government level we saw that there is a desire 
to see greater alignment of Australian programs, projects 
and initiatives with national development agendas. At an 
organisational level, we heard numerous concerns about 
over-reliance on INGOs causing local civil society groups 
to feel marginalised. This is particularly significant when it 
comes to issues of funding and employment. Essentially, 
local civil society groups want to see a greater 
sharing of resources, with them at the forefront of 
service delivery activities, particularly in rural areas. 
Development practitioners in these countries want to 
see their expertise and skills properly valued, including 
through employment opportunities and appropriate levels 
of remuneration. Private sector partnerships were critiqued 
as being extractive, with little skills transfer and limited 
acknowledgement of the capabilities of local businesses.
Values, norms & ways of doing things 
matter…a lot
Across the data from all three countries we were 
struck by the immense value that is placed on Pacific 
cultures and traditions. It is fundamental to Pacific 
islander identity. Pacific island people routinely hold in 
their minds, consciousness and actions a recognition, and 
indeed a celebration, of their cultural diversity alongside a 
sense of commonality of interest, respect, trust, reciprocity 
and an understanding of culture. We have termed these 
characteristics, which were articulated in each country, 
a ‘Pacific Mode’. 
This ‘Pacific Mode’ already operates in some key spaces, 
especially within the mechanisms for Pacific regionalism. 
However, what our data shows is that there are some very 
strong perceptions that Australia has yet to develop an 
understanding and appreciation of the ‘Pacific Mode’. This 
is an echo of critiques elsewhere that Australia is not playing 
its full part in Pacific regionalism, leading some to suggest 
that the membership of the Pacific Islands Forum should be 
reviewed (Carter; 2019).
Describing the ‘Pacific Mode’ is not an attempt to somehow 
‘flatten out’ the vast array of cultural and linguistic diversity 
in the region. Neither is it about somehow distilling or 
essentialising ‘Pacific culture’. Rather, the ‘Pacific Mode’ 
can act as a reminder that when engaging with 
Pacific people we should expect and want to be in 
spaces that are informed by all of its complexities 
and commonalities. It is in these spaces that meaningful, 
and mutually beneficial, relationships can be forged and 
sustained.
A significant subset of the data that feeds into this 
key finding draws from responses that highlighted 
the absence of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people in Australia’s projection and portrayal of itself 
in the region. Participants reflected a desire to engage 
with Indigenous Australians and expressed sadness and 
disappointment that this was not something that happened 
often, if at all. A related issue, particularly in Solomon Islands 
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and Vanuatu, was the historical practice of blackbirding. 
Blackbirding is perceived to be an aspect of Australia’s 
relationships with the Pacific yet to be fully addressed  
and resolved.
Australia is one of many potential 
relationships for Pacific islanders 
Like people anywhere, the participants’ lives are dominated 
by domestic concerns – health, education, livelihoods, peace, 
justice and the quality of their leadership and institutions – 
but they are also concerned about international issues and 
relationships as they intersect with these preoccupations. 
This is most readily apparent in the existential climate change 
threat they face, in which their domestic concerns are 
indeed intimately linked to a wider global agenda. However, 
this more recent nexus connects to a pre-existing sense of 
the linkage between domestic concerns and international 
relations deriving from a long tradition of close ties with 
countries such as Australia.
Many participants recognise the geostrategic place that 
the Pacific occupies and some see the current interest 
in their part of the world as an opportunity for Pacific 
island countries, whether singly or working together, to 
establish new relationships or modify existing ones to better 
align with their own needs and aspirations.
Whilst there is no clear view as to whether Australia 
is (or wants to be viewed as) a ‘Pacific’ country, 
its legitimacy as part of the regional community is 
generally accepted. Australia is nonetheless just one of 
many countries with which participants see they and their 
countries can form and deepen relationships. They see 
opportunities to partner with other Pacific island countries, 
New Zealand, China and others. In the main, they expect that 
Pacific island countries will maintain multiple relationships 
both bilaterally and multilaterally23.
Given this ‘friends to all and enemies to none’ approach, it 
is unsurprising that we heard comparisons between how 
different countries and their citizens behave toward and 
in our target countries. In particular, there were numerous 
comparisons between Australia and New Zealand or China. 
We received the impression from participants that New 
Zealand and its citizens were perceived to have a deeper 
understanding of Pacific issues and this is evident in how 
diplomatic relationships are conducted. Much was also 
made of the stronger position of Maori and Pasifika cultural 
values in official NZ policies and the visibility of leaders from 
those communities in the international arena, including in 
the region. New Zealanders could be seen to operate more 
effectively in the ‘Pacific Mode’.
The role of China is a significant issue for many people. 
However, there is not a great deal of consensus about 
its impacts. Two points have emerged from this data. 
First, participants see that it is the responsibility of their 
governments to manage bilateral relationships with China. 
Secondly, there is a perception among some that Pacific 
regional collective action (which includes Australia) may be a 
way to balance China’s influence. Although not as strong a 
theme, there were certainly indications that Chinese modes 
of engagement were perceived as more acceptable than 
23 The particular political realties around Taiwan and China are an exception to this
Australian approaches in some areas.
Recommendations 
Positive change in Australia’s relationship with the region 
must start with, but is not limited to, the Australian 
government. Even as the Pacific Step-up has been well 
received as progress in the right direction, it is only a first 
step if Australia is to realise the full potential of its Pacific 
relationships. We recommend action in four areas to put 
Australia more firmly on that path:
1 Shift gears on the Step-up 
The increased level of Australian interest in the Pacific is 
well recognised in the region, but it is struggling to gain 
traction as Australia’s desire to do more conflicts with Pacific 
islanders’ wish for Australia to do better. This is because the 
Pacific Step-Up currently operates as something that Australia 
is doing to or, possibly, for the Pacific. Instead, the Step-up 
needs to transform into a deep-seated, multi-faceted and 
nuanced commitment to working with the Pacific. There 
needs to be a move away from Australia’s relationships with 
the Pacific being characterised by a donor/recipient dynamic. 
Instead, Australian relationships with the Pacific need to 
be built on foundations of mutual respect, reciprocity, and 
trust. This requires much more than a change in rhetoric or 
messaging. As has been stated elsewhere (Newton Cain; 
2018, Cox; 2019), Australia needs to listen more and listen 
better. This research demonstrates that Pacific people are 
looking for reassurance that Australia is listening to their 
concerns and working alongside them, as an equal partner, 
to address shared challenges. Australia needs to be open 
to what it can learn from the region. To get this process 
underway we recommend that the Australian government:
• Convene a regional Partnership Summit
There are very few opportunities for open dialogue 
between multiple types of stakeholder from Australia 
and the region. Meetings tend to be confined to one 
type of institution and to have detailed and restricting 
agendas. This could be seen to result in the same 
conversations happening again and again and stifle the 
opportunity for new perspectives to emerge. A forum in 
which different types of people from across the region 
have the chance to speak and listen, guided by themes 
rather than a set agenda, could be a way to break out of 
these closed loops.  
A summit would be the launch pad for ongoing 
cross-sectoral dialogue led by Pacific voices and using 
‘Pacific Mode’ protocols and methodologies. With 
diverse country participation by the Pacific community 
of PIF member states, it should allow for the organic 
development of themes, as led by Pacific islanders, 
and have as its primary purpose the development 
of deeper trust, greater understanding and mutual 
respect. Participation in this summit (and any pre- and 
post- dialogues connected with it) needs to go beyond 
the usual suspects to ensure voices are heard from 
government, civil society, sporting groups, the private 
sector, faith-based groups, traditional leaders, and the 
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community more broadly. The Australian contingent 
must include significant leadership and participation by 
Torres Strait Island and Aboriginal people.
• Deepen relationships beyond the capitals
The network of relationships needs to be both 
broadened and deepened. In Australia, this is more 
than having Pacific temporary workers contributing 
to regional towns and economies. There are cultural, 
sporting, church, and economic relationships to be 
further developed24 and nurtured, with reciprocity 
at their core. In the region it is again these cultural, 
sporting, church and economic relationships that 
require development and sustenance. There should 
also be strategic investment to support both existing 
spaces for economic, cultural and other relationships 
between Torres Strait Islander and Aboriginal people and 
indigenous Pacific islanders, as well as the creation of 
new ones.
• Improve government, private sector and
NGO partnerships  
Participants from all backgrounds observed that 
although they have experienced some good relationships 
with Australian counterparts, others tended to 
be extractive or unequal. They strongly called for 
partnerships that respect local capacity and expertise 
while building other capacities that they acknowledge 
they lack. Medium-term exchanges of personnel are 
particularly sought after.
• Encourage INGOs to transfer power to local civil
society organisations to increase perceived levels
of trust, autonomy and open communication
The frustration expressed by many local civil society 
leaders about delays in project approvals and funding, 
onerous reporting, lack of financial autonomy and poor 
communication confirm the need to give substance 
and urgency to the localisation agenda currently being 
discussed by Australia-based INGOs25. Remedying this 
situation requires change both in those organisations 
and their donors (notably DFAT) to find a better balance 
between accountability and respect for local agency.26
2 Invest in Australia’s Pacific literacy
In order for Australia to be able to act confidently in the
‘Pacific Mode’, gaps in Pacific literacy need to be addressed. 
The data we have collected here reflect a truism that whilst 
24 For more on how church partnerships can contribute to Pacific development see Cochrane; 2018.
25 See, for example, Lehoux (2016).
26 This is in line with recent recommendations from Georgeou and Hawksley (2020) who suggest that the principles of “co-production of knowledge” 
and “research partnerships” are instrumental in developing effective strategies for research and program delivery.
27 There are very limited opportunities to study the Pacific in Australian universities beyond the offering of a Bachelor of Pacific Studies at the Australian 
National University.
28 The ‘Sean Dorney Grant for Pacific Journalism’ administered by the Walkley Foundation and The ‘Pacific Project’ at The Guardian (funded by the Judith 
Neilson Institute for Ideas) are very recent attempts to improve this. Neither of these initiatives receive government funding.
29 Similar to the ‘Asia Capable’ strategy (Asia Link: 2012)
 Pacific island people have a good general knowledge about 
Australia, the reverse is far from true. Moreover Australians 
fare badly in comparison to others, notably New Zealanders 
and Chinese. It is instructive that those two countries each 
engage positively, but very differently, with the ‘Pacific 
Mode’. Australian policy, engagement and interactions 
are thus hampered by a severe lack of Pacific literacy. This is 
nothing new: it has been called out by scholars such as 
Katerina Teaiwa and others for many years. However, in this 
period of ‘stepped up’ engagement this deficit is amplified. 
To remedy this, we recommend that Australia commit 
political, social and economic resources to:
• Promote knowledge of the Pacific in Australia via
schools, universities and the mainstream media
Very little space is allotted for Pacific studies in curricula 
at any level. Pacific studies are on the periphery of the 
tertiary sector and Pacific language study is a low priority 
even within this area of study.27 Despite some positive 
recent initiatives in Australian news media,28 Pacific 
islanders and their concerns feature seldom, if at all, in 
other popular media. Pacific literacy can start with the 
normalisation of awareness of Pacific islands perspectives 
and history, in much the same way that is happening 
with awareness of Australia’s Asian neighbours. 
Developing Pacific literacy is an opportunity to 
recognise and learn from the extensive Pacific diaspora 
communities in Australia. Australians can practise 
listening to and learning from Pacific islanders in the 
classroom and on our TV screens. 
• Develop a ‘Pacific capable’ strategy29
In addition to this general awareness, Australians need 
to be prepared to live, work and socialise with Pacific 
island people in their own country and in the countries 
of the region. The strategy would encourage potentially 
Pacific-focused organisations to build specific measures 
into their strategies and operations to build staff and 
organisational capability, with specific provisions to 
include and learn from Pacific islanders in the region and 
in Australia.
• Work with Pacific diaspora communities to build
the capacity of government departments and agencies
who work in the region (including DFAT, Department of
Defence and others), contractors and INGOs particularly
in the areas of linguistic and cultural competency. This
can also include the secondment of Pacific islander
public servants to Australian agencies.
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3 Get our own house in order
Across numerous aspects of the data, it is evident that 
Pacific islanders know us far better than we know them. 
When they see Australia, they look past our borders to the 
country within, and are not at ease with what they find. 
This adds to the general sense of wariness that participants 
expressed about Australia’s true intentions and whether 
there is a genuine commitment to building and sustaining 
true partnerships and relationships in the region. By looking 
critically at what is happening at home and addressing 
areas where domestic policy and politics are in tension 
with avowed foreign policy objectives, Australia can better 
position itself to engage in the region.
Here we recommend that Australia:
• Demonstrate a systematic, consistent and 
constructive long-term approach to climate change  
This needs to encompass mitigation and adaptation in 
line with the Boe Declaration and the planned 2050 
strategy30 to be considered at the 51st meeting of Pacific 
Islands Forum leaders
• Demonstrate real change in the status of 
Indigenous Australians. Indigenous people need to 
become visible in all walks of Australian life and thus be 
in a position to help shape Australia’s representation to 
and engagement with the world
4 Level the playing field when it comes 
to access
The data we collected echoes what we have heard from 
Pacific people before, including from national leaders. They 
want to be able to travel to Australia more easily and they 
want to see what they produce being sold to Australians. 
These issues are not going to go away and there needs to 
be a lot more honesty in the conversations around them. 
Expanding labour mobility schemes and introducing an 
‘Australia-Pacific card’ for certain already privileged groups 
does not address the expensive, cumbersome and intrusive 
administrative barriers to respectful and efficient travel to 
Australia faced by most Pacific islander people. Lobbying 
Pacific island countries to engage more fully with PACER Plus, 
whether by becoming signatories or by way of ratification, 
without acknowledging the influence of domestic farming 
interest groups is inappropriate and may prove counter-
productive. To address these concerns, we recommend  
that Australia:
• Make it easier for all Pacific people to travel 
to and work in Australia. This includes offering 
increased access to short-term visas, student and 
professional exchange programs and minimising onerous 
administrative and financial burdens
• Prioritise products from the Pacific for regulatory and 
administrative processes (e.g. biosecurity approval) to get 
them into Australian markets 
30 Leaders at the 2019 meeting of Pacific Islands Forum Leaders agreed that a draft strategy would be developed for them to consider at the 51st 
meeting of Pacific Islands Forum leaders in Vanuatu (Armbruster & Newton Cain; 2019).
31 See also, Bohane (2019). Bohane suggests ‘Pacific villages’ in Sydney and Brisbane as conduits for Pacific products.
• Hold a regular Pacific Expo in Australia. The 
excellence of many Pacific products is not well known to 
Australians and investment in prioritising Pacific products 
needs to be matched with investment in building up 
the Australian market. A regular Expo would showcase 
primary and value-added products, foster business-to-
business ties and offer an incentive to Pacific producers 
to get their products ready for the Australian market.31 
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